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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I shall defend the thesis that Question 1, Article 53 of his 
Summa represents an unexpected epistemic sensitivity in the teachings of Henry of 
Ghent. By this, I mean that his discussion of the persons in the Trinity hints at an 
awareness of certain epistemic consequences or assumptions at play in the 
metaphysical use of terms like person, substance, universal, and so on. This 
acknowledgement is unique and original among his contemporaries.  
My argument establishes Henry’s position in context with the traditions he 
inherited by demonstrating the ways in which it is related to the problem of 
individuation, how it is distinct from the positions held by his contemporaries, and why 
it represents the epistemic shift that scholars like Jorge J.E. Gracia attribute to the 
University system of the Late 13th and Early 14th Centuries. I situate Henry’s discussion 
of divine personhood in the context of his teachings on relation to show the difference 
between his treatment of a purely metaphysical issue and one which he takes to require 
linguistic and logical considerations. I then offer a careful exegesis and analysis of the 
text at hand, working through his consideration of the term ‘persona’ as it operates in 
comparison with seven other similar terms. I argue that the epistemic implications of 
this exercise become an integral part of the framework for the remainder of the article.  
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Yes, this is a metaphysical account of personhood, insofar as it is an attempt to 
define the real nature of the subject in question. But, Henry initiates this inquiry by way 
of asking how the term ‘persona’ applies. For example, he considers whether it is a term 
of first or second intention, whether it applies to the actual individual or the universal 
concept, and so on. These are epistemic questions. Prior to this study, a discussion of 
the persons in the Trinity may not have seemed an obvious, or even helpful, place to 
look for Henry’s theory of universals. Yet, here it is. And no one that I know of prior to 
Henry began this way, or, if they did they did not make this explicit in their metaphysical 
analyses. That alone is interesting enough to merit the following study.  
viii 
PREFACE
Henry of Ghent taught in the Theology Faculty at the University in Paris in the 
last quarter of the thirteenth century. Now regarded as one of the most significant 
thinkers of his time, his thought represents the intersection between the two great 
medieval pillars, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, and was developed on the cusp 
of the philosophical boom of the 14th century that gave rise to the Renaissance.1 As a 
prolific writer, an advisor to the sitting Pope, and an authorized witness and actor in the 
historical events surrounding the condemnations of 1277, Henry was an active 
intellectual. He was also a secular theologian. (He did not affiliate himself with an order 
of Friars, like the Franciscans or Dominicans.) As a result, his works did not benefit from 
the same sort of organization and preservation shown to some of his contemporaries. 
Nonetheless, his unique position establishes Henry as a hallmark figure of the rise of the 
University in the High Middle Ages. 
The first printed editions of Henry’s work were compiled by Badius in 1518.2 And 
until recently, served as the standard text for scholarship regarding his thought. But a 
contemporary effort is now well underway to produce a modern critical edition. Under 
the auspices of the Katholik Universitate Leuven, a devoted group of Henry scholars are 
                                                           
1 Wilson, G. A., ed., (2011). A Companion to Henry of Ghent, Leiden-Boston: E.J. Brill. (Brill’s Companions 
to the Christian Tradition, 23). Preface. ISBN 978-90-04-18349-0.  
2 Henry of Ghent, Summa quaestionum ordinariarum. (ed. Badius, Paris, 1520.)  
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carefully putting forth the Opera Omnia series, which includes both his Quodlibeta and 
his Summa. (What Henry referred to as his Quaestiones ordinariae.) The most recent 
text prepared for publication in the series was article 53 of the Summa.  
I had the great privilege of working on this project under the tutelage of Dr. 
Gordon Wilson, the current general editor for the series. From the early stages of 
variation collations and tracing down manuscript family trees to the final stages of 
proofreading and tracking down footnote sources- I lived with this text for several years. 
And while a paleographer’s task is like the scribe’s (concerned primarily with the 
accurate transmission of the text), the philosopher in me could not help but notice the 
content of the material I was transcribing.  
Article 53 is comprised of ten questions concerning ‘Those Things That Pertain to 
the Distinction of the Persons.’ The first question asks, ‘Whether it is necessary to hold 
that there is a person in God.’ That is a very interesting and unexpected place for Henry 
to begin. He does not immediately invoke the authority of scripture, nor assume an 
agreement upon the meaning of relevant terms. He begins the discussion by getting his 
ideas, his terms, the language- clear. He is interested in getting to the heart of the way 
in which we think about, and talk about, the notion of personhood. Is it a necessary tool 
to use? There is no point, so it is implied, in arguing around the problems attached to 
the term, if the term serves no good purpose, or if there is another term which might 
serve our purposes more accurately. Acknowledging this, Henry considers those terms 
which are relevant to the persons of the Trinity- asking of each ‘does this term do a 
x 
better job at referencing the divine, and our concept of the divine, than the term person 
does?’ As we will see, he believes the alternate terms fail at the task. Thus, he concludes 
that ‘persona’ serves as a unique placeholder, linguistically and conceptually, for an 
incommunicable aspect of the essential nature of certain created and uncreated beings. 
 This small, perhaps seemingly clerical, question demonstrates the ways in 
which, for Henry, the notion of personhood is intricately tied to many of his most 
notable teachings- on the Trinity, essence and existence, the notion of relation, free-
will, and so on. It is a jumping off point for a much larger conversation about 
signification, concept formation, and Henry’s infamous ‘intentional distinction.’ And yet, 
it remains to be seen whether Henry has a comprehensive philosophy of personhood, as 
such. If he does, it behooves us to uncover it. For, while there is now a consensus 
amongst Henry scholars on several points, there is also active and vigorous debate. (The 
recent publication of Brill’s Companion to Henry of Ghent stands as a shining example.) I 
hope this project contributes to our growing understanding of his impressive and 
comprehensive body of work.  
Because this is the first undertaking of its kind since the re-introduction of this 
text into the larger body of modernly updated, available works, certain situational 
matters need to be addressed. There is a context to this discussion as a piece of 
literature- In what manner was this text conceived, written, and presented? What 
background knowledge is assumed of the audience? What other texts, or thinkers, or 
discussions should be presumed as relevant? (Such issues are significant when 
xi 
approaching thinkers writing in the universities of Europe during the High Middle Ages 
since they highlight the particularities of an academic culture which directly influenced 
the form and style of their words.) Textual and historical details being established, the 
content of the text, the arguments put forth therein, can properly be considered.  
xii 
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS: PERSONS, INDIVIDUALS, & UNIVERSALS 
As we will see in the exegesis of the fourth chapter, Henry discusses individuals 
and universals on his way towards considering the divine persons. He is reacting to 
certain traditions and philosophical problems as he does so. They offer insight into his 
treatment of the terms.  For example, about ten years before Henry is writing in Paris 
(1277), Roger Bacon discusses the situation of the philosophical problem of 
individuation. He points out the ways in which explanations of individuation could go, 
such as those theories worked out by Bonaventure and Aquinas. Roger Bacon and Henry 
of Ghent each contributed to the development of these positions that happened 
between 1250 and 1300. So, I include brief summaries of the framework here.  
In the High Middle Ages, the standard theological textbook was Peter Lombard’s 
Book on the Sentences. The section on the individuation of angels, specifically, provided 
Medieval thinkers an interesting challenge by which to test their theories of 
individuation. The conversation quickly broadens from angels to matter, in general.   
Given God’s complete freedom and omnipotence, the issue was whether God 
could create several individuals of the same species. (The question is focused on what 
accounts for a certain thing being an individual distinct from other individuals. As 
2 
opposed to what accounts for certain things being the same over time.3) For these 
thinkers, ‘individuum’ was defined as something ‘undivided in itself.’ Of course, the 
matter is further complicated by types of division.4 But it was largely agreed upon by the 
Mid-13th Century that to be an individual was to be undivided. There was also consensus 
that created things belonged to natural kinds, or species, and that there could be 
several instances of the same species if those things shared a common essence. Angels, 
furthermore, were considered individuals.  
Saint Bonaventure: 
Bonaventure posits that all created things are composites of matter and form. For 
him, matter was the equivalent of potentiality and form was roughly the same as 
actuality. Thus, every creature is a composite because every creature is the result of the 
actualization of contingent potentialities. In other words, things could have been 
otherwise. As he put it, limited and changeable.5 According to Bonaventure’s 
framework, God is distinct from creatures because he lacks composition. Angels, 
however, are material/spiritual composites. (Material by quantity, not corporeity or 
extension.) So, angels may be different in kind from corporeal species, but they are 
individuated in the same way. Namely, through the union of matter and form. This also 
                                                           
3 Also known as synchronic individuation, as opposed to diachronic individuation.   
4 Subject/Predicate, Whole/Parts… Something might be divided into integral parts. Such as Socrates is 
divided by his soul and body, and his body is divided by his arms and legs… Or, something may be divided 
into subjective parts. For example, the essence human being is divided into Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. 
If the whole cannot be predicated of its parts, those parts are integral. By contrast, if the whole can be 
predicated by its parts, those parts are subjective. As Georgio Pini summarizes, “When an individual is 
described as what is ‘undivided in itself’, the sort of indivisibility that is being referred to is indivisibility 
into subjective parts. The point is that something is an individual if and only if it is uninstantiable.” (Pini 
p.3)  
5 Pini, 2012. N.9.  
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allows him to account for multiple instances of the angel species, because form itself is 
not what is doing the individuating. Its therefore possible to have the same form or 
essence instantiated in multiple material supposites.  Thus, matter becomes integral to 
the discussion. 
Thomas Aquinas:  
Thomas Aquinas diverges from the tradition to present an alternative set of 
starting premises. First, he held that angels were instances of pure form (what he called 
‘separate substances’) not received in matter. (They were immaterial because they are 
pure minds and minds are immaterial.) And secondly, that form could be numerically 
multiplied only if is received in matter. (Which, for Aquinas, is always extended matter. 
And forms, like whiteness, cannot be divided into instantiations by themselves as forms 
alone.) From which, he concluded, there cannot be several angels of the same species. 
But, rather, there must be as many individual angels, with as many individual essences, 
as there are species. Bonaventure would have rejected the first premises. Most who 
followed, however, take issue with the second. Whether or not Aquinas was successful 
is another matter. But he did relate individuation and universality with immateriality 
and intelligibility in a new, unique way. And he opened a new space for thought on the 
problem of individuation. Because under his schema, there can be a created individual 
which is individual by itself and not divisible into instantiations.6 For material things, 
matter acts as the principle of multiplication and individuation. But immaterial things, 
                                                           
6 This is the materia signata, or designated matter.  
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like angels, can be individual not by common essences but by a principle of individuation 
as their essence.  
On March 7, 1277, the bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier, with the assistance of a 
council of theologians (including Henry of Ghent), issued a Condemnation of 220 theses 
purportedly being taught at the University at Paris. Three of these concerned the 
problem of the individuation of angels. (Articles 81, 96, 191.) Clearly attributed to 
Aquinas, they sought issue with the idea that no two angels could belong to the same 
species. The trouble seemed to be with the implication of a limitation upon God’s 
omnipotence, or ability to create with complete freedom. But, what is important for our 
purposes here is to consider the academic environment and discussions in which Henry 
found himself a part of. The controversy over individuation certainly would have been 
familiar to him as he takes up the subject of personhood and individuation in his 
Summa.  
Henry of Ghent: 
Henry points out that both frameworks, by Bonaventure and Aquinas alike, fail 
to satisfy the problem behind the condemnation. The difficulty is that the nature of 
created beings (whether material or immaterial) places restrictions upon God’s ability as 
creator. He rejects this line of thinking by maintaining that all created essences are 
common and individualized, not by matter, but by something else added to them.  
5 
Henry dealt with the issue of the individuation of angels, specifically, in two 
places: Quodlibet 2, question 8 and Quodlibet 5, question 8.7  These two treatments 
demonstrate an evolution in Henry’s thoughts on the subject. In Quodlibet 2, Henry 
takes issue with the implication that angels are necessary beings. He maintains that 
Aquinas provides a view which entails the divinity of angels because they are individual 
essences they cannot fail to exist. (As established by Henry’s link between actual 
existence and individuation. Since he maintained that whatever does not actually exist, 
exists as a mental construct, and therefore, as a universal.) He does not reject the idea 
completely. He admits that individuation can occur through the instantiation of matter, 
just rejects that it is the only way. He allows for a difference here between created and 
uncreated being.  
A few years later, in his fifth Quodlibet, Henry treats matter as the ‘secondary 
principle of individuation.’ Here he states that any essence, whether material or 
immaterial, is made individual by a primary principle of individuation. (By this point, the 
focus is larger than that of angels. It is a problem in all types of things and beings.) This 
primary principle is the double negative property of not being divided in itself and not 
being the same as anything else. (In other words, not being multiply instantiated and 
not being distinct.) The difference, or evolution, lies in the rejection of a need for some 
extra, positive capacity for multiplication. It is based on his distinction between 
potentiality and possibility. Something may be inclined to be numerically multiplied, 
according to Henry, but this is not the same as saying it is possible for an essence to be 
                                                           
7 Pini, 2012. N.52. 
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numerically multiplied. The possession of an inclination implies the possession of a 
positive feature. A certain form must receive that inclination by way of a real entity like 
matter. In conjunction, it is also possible for something to be multiply instantiated even 
in the absence of a positive feature, so long as it does not contradict another feature. 
Henry identified a sense of possibility as non-repugnance which is different from the 
standard Aristotelian notion of potentiality. This is an important distinction for his own 
solution to the problem of individuation.   
Roger Bacon: 
Roger Bacon’s Communia Naturalium was written in the 1260s, just a decade 
before Henry was teaching in the Faculty of Arts.8 In it, Bacon lays out what he takes to 
be the primary problems of individuation and universals, and how those problems have 
led some of his peers to defend unsuccessful solutions.   
He treats the problem of individuation in Chapter 9, claiming that its cause has 
clearly arisen out of his discussion of universals and singulars, even though it as an 
‘unresolved issue obscured by many false responses.’9 Three inadequate positions are 
mentioned. First, there are those who ‘say that species is the whole essence of 
individuals and that it only has different acts of being in them.’10 Second, there is the 
position which holds that ‘matter added to universal form’ results in the individual.11 
And third, ‘others maintain that potency is added to species as to a signature, and thus 
                                                           
8 1268-1270. (Hackett.)  
9 Maloney, p.93. CN, par. 30.  
10 Ibid., par.31. 
11 Ibid., par.32. 
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it is signified in different things.’12 These are false claims, Bacon argues, since neither 
man (the universal) nor something added to man (some accidental feature to an 
essence or matter to a form) makes this man (the individual). This man, the individual 
man, is prior to man, the universal, ‘in the operation and intent of nature…an individual, 
in as much as it is an individual, naturally has its own true being and essence first, before 
its universal arises.’13 So neither a universal nor anything added to it is the cause of 
individuation.  
As this soul and this body make this man and as soul and body constitute man, 
Bacon writes, the proper principles entering the essence of an individual constitute him. 
He cites the seventh book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, where Aristotle asserts that 
universal man is composed of universal soul and universal body, and that this man is 
composed of a particular soul and a particular body (in which one has this rational 
element and this animal element). Thus, Bacon maintains that the individual is a 
composition, and so too the universal.  Given this criteria for a universal, he points out 
that there could be endless universals- no first or last- certainly just as many as there are 
individuals. So, the line of singulars must take precedence in nature over the 
subordinated line of universals.  
He then admonishes the sophists who poorly interpreted Aristotle’s words in On 
the Heaven and the Earth, where Aristotle writes that when one speaks of the heavens, 
they are speaking only of form, and when one speaks of man they are referring to form 
                                                           
12 Ibid., par.33.  
13 Ibid., par.35.  
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in matter. The incorrect interpretation is that matter added to specific form makes an 
individual. ‘What is true,’ Bacon insists, ‘is that matter is not spoken of here in the same 
sense as when it is the other part of a composite, nor as when it is a subject in 
generation, but as that which is the foundation of something in which that thing would 
consist.’14 Bacon interprets Aristotle to mean that matter as a subject is matter in which 
there is an accident. In the same way, an individual is the matter in which exists a 
universal. In this way, a universal is like an accident.  
Next, he turns his attention to those who allege on the authority of Boethius that 
species is the whole being of individuals, and again insists that the being of an individual 
is twofold. (One is absolute according to those principles inhering in its essence and 
does not imply species as the being of an individual. The other exists because of the 
connection one individual has with another by virtue of a common nature, and that 
being does constitute the species of the individual.)  
What then does he suggest, if individuation is not caused by species or anything 
added to it? He suggests we turn the question around and inquire into the cause of the 
universal if it is neither the individual nor anything added to it. In other words, he 
repeats, this whole question is foolish because it stems from the false dichotomy of 
species/something added on to species, etc. There is no need for the construct. The 
individual has its own properties, adhering in its own essence. The universal has its own 
properties.  
                                                           
14 Maloney, p.94. CN, par.39. 
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And as to those principles, like matter and form, and their cause of individuation, 
Bacon asks what causes a universal to be a universal? It is so, they must say, because the 
Creator made it so according to his propriety and its natures demands. And this goes on 
for every instance of individuation and universal and is therefore finally dismissed as a 
foolish pursuit.  
The problem of universals, essentially, is whether universals exist in the mind or 
outside of the mind. (This is similar to Porphyry’s question. When we say, ‘this is a tree’, 
does the term signify something in the object or is it just a name?)  But there is a 
moderate path. So, he posits the question with a slight amendment. Do universals exist 
in themselves, in the soul, or in things outside the mind? The solutions given, he 
suggests, fall into the following possible categories: 
1. Universals exist only in the mind. There is no universality which exists outside the 
mind. (The ‘celebrated position’.)   
2. The universal exists only in singulars/things and does not depend on the mind at 
all.15 Universality affects only mental words/concepts. (Bacon)  
3. Universal aspects exist outside the mind but inside the mind as universals. This 
moderate realism draws a distinction between that which is conceived and the 
way it is conceived. 
(*3a. Universals exists as an intention- what can only be called universal in an 
equivocal sense, as an abstracted likeness, species in the mind. It is in the thing 
                                                           
15 Communia Naturalium, p.102 1-3. 
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as an indeterminate. But it does not have proper existence outside or inside the 
mind.) 
4. Universals exist outside the mind, not in singulars, but as universal/ideal entities.  
Bacon’s own solution to the problem is complicated and has garnered legitimate 
debate. He distinguishes between the real universal and the mental universal. 
Universals are not just, or only, the species as mental intention. They are extra-mental 
as the basis for scientific objectivity. He maintains that the universal is either in the mind 
or in things. A universal arises from common matter and common form, which are 
always present with the proper matter and form, so have no need of being split apart. 
Furthermore, the universal precedes the knowledge process because it is merely a 
nature of which singulars agree. The particulars agree without any act of the mind. Yet 
they occur and agree in existing individual supposites, not as separate Platonic forms. 
Pointing to Boethius and Al-Ghazali, Bacon acknowledges the view of accidents 
as the source of individuation. But rejects these accounts in favor of an interconnection 
of form and matter. Since matter and form constitute the thing. For Bacon, an individual 
is an individual and a substance. In the Parisian lectures he holds that matter is the 
cause of individuation, but form is a co-cause. (The latter as an instrumental/formal 
cause, rather than the principle cause.) In his later work, Communia Naturalium, he 
holds consistent to these views, but offers new qualifications. His framework serves as 
an alternative to what he understands as subordinating individuals to their universal.   
“But if we would speak about the universal nature that is the directing power 
of the universe, [we should say that] it intends and brings about an individual 
11 
first and principally, about which there is mention in the Book of the Six 
Principles. Nature operates in a hidden manner in things: once a determinate 
man is generated, man as such is generated. And the cause of this is that one 
individual excels all universals in the world, for a universal is nothing but the 
agreement of many individuals.” ([OHI,II], 94, = TTUM, 86)  
Theodore Crowley (1950) and Jorge J. E. Gracia (1991) saw the beginnings of a kind 
of nominalism in Bacon’s remarks. But more recently, focusing on Communia 
Naturalium specifically, Thomas S. Maloney has made the case for reading Bacon as an 
extreme realist.16 In this later treatise, we can at least say, the individual has ontological 
power over genera and species. As Jeremiah Hackett summarizes, “His account becomes 
an attack on contemporary positions influenced by Albertus Magnus that would 
subordinate the individual to the universal. Species and genera are there for the sake of 
the production of the individual.”17 For Bacon, certainly, the universal (whatever it is) is 
tied up with and dependent upon the individual. He treats the universal as a common 
nature in which particulars agree, extending into them and existing in them. And he 
argues that without particulars, there can be no universals. They are related in the same 
essential way matter and form are- they cannot be separated.  
This is remarkably similar to the hesitations Henry demonstrates when speaking of 
the divine persons as individuals for the very fact that they are inextricably linked to 
universals. When we consider the account by Bacon in Communia Naturalium alongside 
the philosophical problem of individuation discussed previously, it becomes clear that 
Bacon’s teachings must have influenced Henry’s careful treatment of the subject in 
Summa, Article 53, question 1. Bacon’s challenges certainly would have had some 
                                                           
16 Maloney, 1985.  
17 Hackett, 2015. (Par.4.5)  
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impact on Henry, who no doubt read his predecessors provocation "Since the whole 
rabble [at Paris] holds the contrary position, because of certain authorities, the views of 
the latter must be presented" ([OHI,II], 96 =TTUM, 90).  
And so, Henry inherits this rich debate about individuation, universals, matter 
and form, and turns it from the subject of angels, to matter and form, to the question of 
divine persons. Individuum, undivided in itself, is by now a complicated and problematic 
notion. That understanding serves as explanation for Henry’s dismissal of the term in 
favor of persona for conveying the proper nature of the persons in a monotheistic, yet 
triune, God.  
THE TEXT: SUMMA, ARTICLE 53, QUESTION 1 
It is important to acknowledge this text as a part of Henry’s Summa, as opposed 
to his Quodlibeta. As Gordon Wilson details in his contribution to the Brill Companion 
series, Henry’s written legacy is nuanced and calls for careful consideration. The two 
most significant works attributed to Henry, his Quodlibeta and Quaestiones ordinariae 
(Summa) are two very different types of literature. Both represent an aspect of the 
academic culture of the time but as separate genres.  
The Quodlibeta are the result of public disputations, held in Paris during the Lent 
and Advent seasons, where a master would voluntarily participate in an oral question 
and answer session with the public. Any question could be posed of the master, and a 
few days later the master came before the public to resolve them. The questions coming 
from the audience were not under the control of the master, though he did have the 
13 
opportunity to produce a written version afterward so that certain ideas could be 
expounded upon. The Quodlibetal material (15 in Henry’s case) are relevant to Henry’s 
Summa for the purposes of dating as well as authentication. Because the Quodlibeta 
were raised regularly over a period of fifteen years, almost the span of Henry’s career in 
the Theology Faculty, they have become, as Gordon Wilson puts it “the Rosetta stone 
for unlocking the dating of articles in Henry’s Quaestiones ordinariae.” 18 The Quodlibeta 
make reference to the Summa (Qo) and vice versa, allowing scholars to authenticate 
each as Henry’s own teachings and reconstruct the timeline of his writings.  
Unlike the Quodlibeta, Henry was in complete control of his Quaestiones 
ordinariae (Summa). Based upon his classroom lectures in the theology faculty in Paris, 
these questions were chosen, formulated, and organized by Henry alone. There is a 
reason to believe, by Henry’s own admission, that the Summa is unfinished. He intended 
it to be two, symmetrical sections: one on God and the second on creatures. But, 
presumably because of his death, the second section was never completed. 
Nonetheless, what we do have stands as a purposefully constructed work on its own.  
There are at least three stages in the transmission of Henry’s Summa. The first 
was the delivery of the lecture. One assumes this oral stage involved preliminary notes 
of some kind. The second stage was when Henry prepared a text, based on the lecture, 
for the University. The third was when the university prepared an exemplar divided into 
                                                           
18 (2011b) “Henry of Ghent’s Written Legacy,” in G.A. Wilson, ed., A Companion to Henry of Ghent, Leiden-
Boston: E.J. Brill. (Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition, 23), p. 12.  
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pecia for distribution to scholars and students.19 Due to the nature of teaching over 
time, corrections were made, and variations arose across manuscript copies. For this 
reason, it is difficult to concisely ‘date’ the Summa. There is the date of the original 
lecture, the first composition given to the university, the transcription of the library 
copy, or the availability of a bookstore model. Scholars are admittedly uncertain on this 
topic. Raymond Macken suggested that articles 1-61 of the Summa were delivered to 
the university for it to make its copy all at once at Paris in 1289. While R. Wielockx 
proposed, based on a manuscript of Godfrey of Fontaine, that a copy was available 
much earlier- perhaps as early as 1276. It is unclear whether the Summa came out in 
one piece, or was gradually made available upon section completions, or finally 
delivered as a whole posthumously.20  
What we do know is that these questions are, in fact, the teachings of Henry of 
Ghent, that they represent his thoughts and work on theology and philosophy while he 
was teaching in the Theology Faculty at Paris21, and that they were originally written 
sometime between 1275 and the remaining decade or more of his career.  
Now that the critical edition of this text has been published, the great task of 
translations and commentary can begin. The Latin is now ready for official translations 
                                                           
19 Ibid., p.14.  
20 Ibid., p.15.  
21 Including also his time as a member of the Faculty of Arts.  
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to accompany it. Roland Teske’s English translation of the Summa, article 53 was 
published in 2014. I have used his translation exclusively here.22 
In the fifty-third article of his Quaestiones Ordinarae (Summa), Henry of Ghent 
considers ‘Those Things That (in God) Pertain to the Distinction of the Persons.’ By 
‘things’ Henry means attributes, and he has just dealt (in article fifty-two) with those 
attributes that in God pertain to the common substance. For Henry, the distinction of 
the Persons is nuanced and requires a multi-faceted investigation. He develops the 
following organization of what he takes those requirements to be:  
A. Proper distinction between individual persons and the relations between them. 
B. Proper distinction, of individual persons, as general or particular. 
C. Proper distinction between persons and their properties. 
D. Proper distinction between manner of being and emanation. 
 To properly address the matter of those things/attributes that pertain to the 
distinction of the persons (in God), Henry takes up ten questions. Each of the ten 
questions, in some way, deal with our understanding of God as having the attribute of 
person, or the function/meaning of the language we use to develop and convey that 
understanding. He begins, as mentioned above, with the question of whether it is 
necessary to hold that there is a person in God. (And here, he carefully distinguishes 
between the terms we use to talk about persons, or beings with similar attributes. 
Essentially, he begins by clarifying and defining his terms.) Question two asks whether, 
                                                           
22 Henry of Ghent’s Summa of Ordinary Questions, (Articles 53–55) on the Divine  Persons, Translation 
from the Latin, Introduction, and Notes by Roland J. TESKE  (Milwaukee, WI, 2014). 
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in God, ‘person’ has being in God in a proper sense or a transferred sense. (Here, he 
considers the sense/reference of the term as it relates to the real object.) And so on.  
In these ten questions, we find a reflection on the traditional sources for a definition 
of person, an original treatment of eight terms that are seemingly similar to the term 
‘person,’ an attempt to reconcile Aristotelian notions with Augustinian ones, further 
insight into Henry’s own theory of universals, and more.  As the first formal exegesis and 
analysis to be undertaken of Henry’s Summa, art.53 since its recent preparation for the 
critical edition, we must begin with the first question- Henry’s treatment of eight terms, 
as they pertain to the necessity of personhood in relation to the divine essence. In this 
question, Henry specifically refers to the discussion of person he inherited. So, the next 
chapter provides insight into the traditional sources he is attempting to reconcile. At 




It is often said of philosophers (by other philosophers) that he or she ‘did not live 
in a vacuum.’ This adage serves as a reminder that, while there is value in carefully 
homing in on a text, or even a fragment of text, it is also important to consider the 
larger context within which a thinker or idea is situated. For medieval thinkers, writing 
as Henry did during the rise of the University, this consideration is almost a 
requirement. (The nature of the material alone is an important aspect to include in 
one’s investigations into a text, since the difference between a Summa and Quodlibetal 
questions can also result in a difference in style or approach.) We will see, from the 
onset of the first question, that Henry makes use of many sources and alludes to a 
variety of thinkers throughout his own discussions. If one is unaware of the background 
and details of these traditions, one will miss out on the full meaning of his references.  
So, at this point, let us turn our attention to the traditional sources on the 
distinction of the divine persons that Henry has inherited, and is responding to. While 
he directly mentions three thinkers (Augustine, Boethius, and Richard of St. Victor), 
there are other historical conversations happening in the background of the one 
regarding the definition of person. Those are the ancient problem of language 
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(articulated by Plato and Aristotle, regarding the relationship between thoughts, words, 
and things), and a developing debate about individuation and universals.  
I consider the traditional sources as addressing three separate, but related, 
philosophical problems: Language, Personhood, and Individuation.  
THE ANCIENTS & MEDIEVALS ON LANGUAGE 
The thirteenth century may have seen a heightened sophistication in theories 
about the relationship between language and reality, but the attempt at such a 
formulation has ancient roots.  
In the Cratylus, Plato expresses concern over the ways in which we might explain 
the connection between words and the things they are meant to represent. He sets up 
the dichotomy that this relationship is either one of mere convention (whereby any 
name can be linked to anything, properly, if there is agreement) or some absolute 
feature of reality (whereby certain words are naturally suited to represent certain 
things). The standard interpretation of his theory of Forms has posited Plato, himself, as 
a realist of the latter sort, but whether that is correct is not my concern here. What is 
important is the distinction between the real and the linguistically agreed upon, and the 
direction that Plato’s student, Aristotle, chose to take his own examinations in 
response.23  
In On Interpretation, Aristotle argues for the conventionalist understanding of 
the relationship between words and things, claiming that a name is a spoken sound 
                                                           
23 See Umberto Eco, On Meaning and Denotation.  
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significant by convention. According to his semantic scheme, things in the world are 
signified by words/symbols/sounds only through concepts (or as he calls them, 
affections of the soul/mental images). These notions, or affections of the soul, are the 
same for everyone (despite variance in sound/symbol/words) because they are affected 
by the forms of reality which are also the same. Thus, these mental images- these 
semantic intermediaries- are ‘universal.’  
Following Aristotle, the Stoics picked up and expanded upon this idea of an 
intermediate possibility between Plato’s original real/mental dichotomies. Giving 
further attention to the project on the truth of sentences, begun by Aristotle in his 
Categories, the Stoics developed their own ontology which consisted of signifiers, name-
bearers, and significations. (These significations, or lekta, were understood as states-of-
affairs.)24  
Early medieval thinkers were influenced by these ancient debates, and both 
Augustine and Boethius alike are deeply indebted to these earlier schemes. They 
understood the relationship between words, thoughts, and things as such: written 
symbols signify spoken utterances, which in turn signify a mental image (common to all 
humans), and the terms of this image signify things in the world.25  However, Henry’s 
medieval predecessors did not agree upon the details of this scheme, and many had 
found themselves in trouble for the stances that they had taken as a result. Peter 
Abelard, for example, considered the problems of language in relation to logic and 
                                                           
24 Marenbon, John. 2005.  
25 In medieval texts, ‘significatio’ is typically a causal/psychological relation, such that- w signifies a thing, 
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accepted the usual causal scheme of signification, but diverged in his conceptualist 
understandings of it. For Abelard, these universals do not actually exist in the world- in 
fact, nothing exists in the world except particulars. The universals, signified by 
predicates, are merely thought-content. 
It is this sort of discussion that led to the 13th Century phenomenon referred to 
as Boethius’ speculative grammar. The speculative grammarians sought to give grammar 
the kind of universality required of an Aristotelian science. (In other words, they wanted 
a scheme that extended beyond the Latin language in which they particularly worked.) 
To accomplish this, they held a distinction between modes of being 
(properties/attributes of things- like being pretty), modes of thinking (an intellect 
thinking about an attribute- she is pretty), and modes of signifying (the linking process 
which makes something a part of speech and adds features to it, such as case or tense).  
This is the debate that the logicians and philosophers at Paris in the thirteenth 
century inherited. And they were tasked with developing further the ways in which this 
theory of language correlated with other theological and philosophical commitments. 
And while Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham are usually put forth as representative of this 
project, Henry was also significantly involved with it. Of interest to our purposes here, 
this word-thought-thing relationship has deeply important implications for a theory of 
the term ‘person.’  
In the fifty-third article of his Summa, Henry directly mentions Augustine, 
Boethius, and Richard of St. Victor. He returns to these three thinkers repeatedly 
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throughout the article. For Augustine, Boethius, Richard of St. Victor, and Henry- the 
features of terms have broader importance than grammatical correctness, especially 
when it comes to terms that directly apply to the divine. And their idea of the divine 
nature, and the words they used to signify the real thing, was one made up of three 
persons. 
DEFINITIONS OF PERSONHOOD 
When it comes to discussions of individuality, and personhood more specifically, 
one can see the influence of Boethius upon latter generations through the likes of 
Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, and I argue, Henry. Yet, as we progress further- into late 
scholasticism- one will see that references to his name and works begin to disappear 
from both logical and metaphysical treatises on the subject. A large part of the reason 
for this is what happened to Boethius’ writings during the High Middle Ages, when 
thinkers such as Henry began to correct and critique them considering alternative 
accounts. In Henry’s case, Boethius was believed to have been corrected by Richard of 
St. Victor. So, borrowing from Richard’s framework, Henry develops his own account of 
divine persons which seeks to improve upon the problematic arguments he had 
inherited.  
The attempts we see in Henry’s Summa, art.53, represent the ways in which 
Boethius was slowly traded out for newer models, or at least, was subsumed into them 
after having been adjusted to fit. Neither Augustine nor Boethius laid out a purposeful 
treatise on individuality alone, so their ideas on such topics must be gleaned from 
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fragments and statements found within other discussions. Nevertheless, one can 
reconstruct a basic account of Boethius’ position from his three main Commentaries and 
De Trinitate, as most of the Medievals understood it.26   
As was suggested previously, Boethius’ De Trinitate was perhaps the most 
influential text that Henry and his contemporaries relied upon to construct Boethius’ 
own views about personhood. The full title of this work highlights its theological nature 
of the treatise- Quomodo Trinitas unus Deus ac non tres dii. (Or, concerning how the 
trinity is One God and not Three Gods.) The intentions behind this text were to show 
how unity and multiplicity are reconciled in the divinity, which for Christian thinkers, is 
monotheistic yet triune in nature. In this work, he attacks this project by contrasting the 
notions of plurality and unity, and after examining the principle cause of the former, 
argues that there can be no such notion attributed to God. (For, there are no accidental 
or specific distinctions found in the divine nature.) For purposes of his discussion of 
plurality, the key passage of the text for medieval thinkers became: 
“The principle (ratio) of this union [i.e. the union of the trinity] is indifference. 
Difference cannot be avoided by those who add to or take from [this unity], 
as do the Arians, who, by positing degrees of merit within the Trinity, break it 
up and convert it to plurality. For the source (principium) of plurality is 
otherness; apart from otherness plurality is unintelligible. And so, the 
diversity between three or more things lies in genus or species or number. For 
‘diverse’ is predicated of everything of which ‘the same’ (idem) is said. But 
‘the same’ is said in three ways: By genus, as when a man [is said to be] the 
same as a horse because their genus, animal, is the same. Or by species, as 
when Cato [is said to be] the same as Cicero because [they belong] to the 
same species, man. Or by number, as with Tully and Cicero, because he is one 
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in number. This is why ‘diverse’ also is said by genus, species, and number. 
But variety of accidents causes (facit) numerical difference. Three men differ 
neither by genus nor species but by their accidents, for if we mentally remove 
from them [all other] accidents, still each one occupies a different place 
which cannot possibly be regarded as the same for each, since two bodies 
cannot occupy the same place, and place is an accident. Wherefore, it is 
because they are plural by their accidents that they are plural in number.”27 
One can distinguish, in this passage, three distinct issues. The first principle 
identifies indifference (or lack of difference) as the source of all unity. The second is 
concerned with various kinds of difference. And the last part of the passage identifies 
the cause of numerical difference. In all three sections, a large part of the difficulty of 
interpretation lies in Boethius’ unsystematic use of terminology. So, when we turn to 
the issues contained within the problem of individuality below, we will see why this text 
would have proved problematic for later thinkers who shared the basic intentions of the 
overall goal- Boethius does not adequately address them. The intension of individuality 
is not discussed here, though the intension of numerical difference is discussed 
elsewhere.28 Extension and ontological status are not explicitly discussed, and neither is 
the principle of individuation. And, Boethius offers little in the way of an examination of 
discernibility or linguistic function. 
Henry shares the intentions which are behind this text with Boethius. Namely, he 
too wants to demonstrate how the univocal nature of the divine can be reconciled with 
the notion of triune persons composing it. Where Henry disagrees with Boethius is the 
extension of this notion of individuation to the nature of the divine persons. For, what 
Boethius says in the same text about a person, brings up unique philosophical problems, 
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not only for Henry, but for most of the medieval thinkers engaging in the topic. To see 
how this becomes so problematic, we must now specifically narrow our focus of this 
text to Boethius’ definition of person.  
Boethius defines person as ‘an individual substance of a rational nature.’29 His 
definition is useful for the philosophers of the High Middle Ages because it employs 
those philosophical groupings found in Aristotle’s Categories, in such a way that 
Boethius’ ‘individual substance’ corresponds to Aristotle’s ‘primary substance’(ousia 
prote), his ‘nature’ to the Aristotelian ‘physis’ and his use of ‘rational’ to the Greek 
‘logon ekhon’.  
According to Aristotle, a primary substance is that which is neither the predicate 
of a substance nor inherent in a substrate but is a substrate itself. (Substrate, taken 
from the Greek hypokeimenon and Latin subjectum, to mean ‘that which lies beneath’ or 
‘subject of becoming’.) In other words, substrate refers to that of which a.) Universal 
concepts are predicates, and b.) Accidental properties adhere in. Since the substrate is 
not predicated of anything else and not inherent in anything else, it must be ‘in itself’. 
The substance is primary, because it must be permanent, lasting, ‘underneath’, as 
opposed to secondary qualities which do not exist ‘in themselves’, but rather, in the 
substrate, yet are still constitutive of its essence. Hence, Boethius’ interpretation of 
‘individual substance’. Boethius meant by ‘individual’ not indivisible, but undivided in 
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1-6. 
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itself. Thus, a primary substance must be first, a substrate, or subject, and must be 
individual.  
Boethius’ expression of a ‘rational nature’ within the definition of person implies 
that the individual substance is clarified by the essence of possessing logos. Boethius 
takes the notion of ‘nature’ from the Greek physis/phuo, meaning birth, and the Latin 
nascor, natura, which means that which a living thing is by birth. The quality of being 
‘rational’ refers to possessing logos (logon ekhon) as ratio, verbum, or oratio/sermo 
(reason including discourse and literacy).  
The problem, then, arises because, according to Aristotle, metaphysics applies to 
all things. Boethius’ definition of person, then, must apply to divine persons, or the 
person of Jesus Christ, as well as other human persons. His account, however, proves 
problematic for reconciling a triune, yet monotheistic God- with three persons, as 
father, son, and Holy Spirit. For one thing, what would it mean to say that the persons of 
the trinity are separate substances? Or, that they are the same substance? God’s 
nature, as triune, cannot be discussed in the same way the substance of a human being 
can. Furthermore, attributing the quality of a ‘rational nature’ to God also proves 
problematic.  
Henry, of course, inherits these metaphysical traditions of interpretation which 
developed from Boethius’ claims in De Trinitate. But, this is not the only tradition with 
which he is familiar. For, Henry is also aware of the writings of Peter Abelard and John of 
Salisbury, who grounded their own interpretations in Boethius’ logical works. Like those 
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concerned with the metaphysical debate alone, Abelard and John of Salisbury share 
various features which allow them to be investigated together for our purposes. In 
addition to their references of the Porphyrian-Boethian notion of individuality as 
unpredicability of many30, those who studied the logical works, also tend to reject the 
cause of individuation as accidental and insist that it be extended to all entities, whether 
substantial or accidental.  
This tradition pays much closer attention to the semantic and linguistic issues 
involved with the discussion of proper names and terms; an issue largely overlooked by 
the others with purely theological, or metaphysical, concerns. Abelard’s own position, as 
is examined by Gracia, is that individuals, unlike universals, are both things/objects and 
words. In his logical works, moreover, he considers them primarily as words. Hence, the 
semantic/linguistic concerns that seep into the High Middle Ages. However, Abelard 
does not provide a theory concerning their ontological status. For this reason, Gracia 
contrasts Abelard’s theory against those of an ‘Accidental Theory of Substantial 
Individuation,’31 an ‘Essential’ one,32 and a ‘Formalist Theory with Criticisms,’33 stating 
that Abelard’s own theory is a ‘Word View’ of individuation.  
At this point, we hit that historical boundary that Gracia wrote of between the 
Early Middle Ages and the shift in the High Middle Ages towards modernity. This is in no 
way meant to be an exhaustive account of Boethius or the early medieval debate about 
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individuation that he inspired. It is a significant point in our project though, because it 
represents the bulk of the theories that Henry inherited, before contributing his own 
thoughts to the historical/philosophical narrative of personhood. Though his discussion 
also fits into the larger debate on universals, this study restricts itself primarily to 
individuation as it applies to the concept and meaning of the term ‘person’ (persona). I 
have drawn this restriction for several reasons, among them breadth of the subject and 
texts yet to be published, but also, I think that Henry’s discussion of person in article 53 
of his Summa, specifically, provides a philosophically significant insight into the 
development and evolution of the larger conversation. 
The crux of the problem, for Henry, is that Boethius did not distinguish clearly 
between the epistemological issue concerning the cause (or principle) of discernibility of 
individuals and the metaphysical one. Gracia states that only in the later Middle Ages do 
we find a “consistent and prolonged attempt to deal with these two problems 
separately, although the epistemic issue was never regarded as important as the 
metaphysical one.” For, as he argues, “this is only to be expected of an age which had 
no place for epistemology as a separate science.”34 
In his De Trinitate, Richard of St. Victor offers a discussion of personhood which 
attempts to resolve the problems found with Boethius’ definition. The result is a 
meaning of the term which focuses on existence, as a distinct issue apart from essence. 
In the fourth book of this text, after admitting the difficulty with considering a plurality 
of persons in a unity of substance, Richard defines person as an ‘incommunicably proper 
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existence of a spiritual nature’ (spiritualis naturae incommunicabilis existentia). He 
rejects the connotations of the Greek hypostasis, pointing out that a word denoting 
substance may signify a more generic or specific property, whereas the person signifies 
‘an individual, singular, incommunicable property’. When considered with this 
distinction, substance is understood to answer ‘what?’ by categorizing something with a 
common property, whereas person answers ‘who?’ by giving a name (or its equivalent) 
through a singular property. Because, when it comes to the divine persons, they share 
one simple and indivisible being, God.  Plurality of such personal properties must not 
imply plurality of substance.  
Here, Richard presents a division relevant to the definition of ‘person’ between 
mode of being and mode of obtaining being. The former being one’s nature, or that 
which he/she more generically or specifically possesses, the latter as obtention 
(obtinentia) - the principle of one’s origin. This distinction allows him to distinguish 
between angelic personhood, human personhood, and divine personhood. To have 
divine personhood, then, is to be a person solely by obtention. To be an angelic person 
is to be so purely by qualitative difference. And to have human personhood means to be 
a person according to both modes simultaneously. Obtention, or the divine, becomes 
the common existence or mode of being shared by all three. Because of the 
incommunicable nature of the divine subsistence, one may speak of several personal 
existences without compromising the unity of the substance (divine substance).  
29 
Henry is not alone in his reading of Richard’s definition as providing a 
philosophical correction to the one found in Boethius. But, he is alone in what he does 
because of that acceptance. Henry no doubt appreciated Richard’s alterations because 
they provide the basis for a relational definition of person, generally, and divine 
persons, specifically.35  Taking up this project, he offers his own account of personhood, 
one which shows a rather surprising (and some would say modern) awareness of 
epistemic issues, arising from the metaphysical conversation at hand.  
The Problem of Individuation 
This dissertation, like the article it examines, is primarily concerned with Henry 
of Ghent’s treatment of the divine persons. But the problem of individuation, though 
not explicitly stated as such during the Early Middle Ages, is intricately linked to the 
ideas of personhood and universals which are developed in the thirteenth century. 
Because of this correlation, I refer to Jorge Gracia’s scholarship on individuation in the 
Middle Ages as a point of reference. And so, a brief summation of his arguments may be 
helpful for those unfamiliar with the historical progression of these ideas.36  
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P.F.Strawson’s Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. His treatment of the ‘primitive person’ is 
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Gracia devoted two separate texts to the philosophical issue of individuation in 
the Middle Ages. The first, Individuation in the Early Middle Ages, and the second 
Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages until the Counter-Reformation. He 
considers these time periods separately, in part due to the enormous span of time they 
encompass, but primarily for the marked distinction between the treatment of 
individuation before and after the thirteenth century. These thinkers share a common 
textual foundation for their notion of individuation. As Gracia points out, this limited 
textual foundation changes and increases enormously when, during the latter part of 
the twelfth century, numerous translations from ancient and Islamic medieval works are 
introduced to the West. This is precisely the time at which Henry is writing- as a 
member of the Faculty of Arts at the University at Paris. This introduction of new ideas 
and texts forces new accounts to be provided for old problems, especially those 
metaphysical theories about the nature of being and the difference of individuation. 
This transition can easily be seen in the High Middle Ages, when one considers the 
breadth of attention paid to those topics in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, John Duns 
Scotus and William of Ockham. (Gracia argues that the last of the authors to be 
unaffected by the new texts and ideas are Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury, and that 
these writings represent an historical boundary of sorts- where any study on the topics 
must draw a line of distinction.)37 
As Gracia acknowledges, the thirteenth century is the first place in Western 
philosophical literature where the issues associated with individuality are considered for 
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their own sake. Early medieval writers pay great attention, for instance, to the so-called 
problem of universals. Yet there are no treatises, disputations, or chapters of books 
devoted solely to the question of individuals. (p.255) His thesis is that they failed to 
discuss the problem separately because they were too focused on the related issues of 
solving the philosophical problem of universals and explaining the theological doctrine 
of the Trinity.  
The relevance of individuality to the context of the Trinity is quite obvious. Since 
individuality was primarily understood by the early Medievals as distinction or numerical 
difference, the dilemma of a triune God becomes one of logical consistency. If God is 
one, then he must be indivisible, that is, individual. But that contradicts the triune 
aspect of the formula, which grants divinity to three persons. If God is three, numerically 
different, persons it contradicts the monotheistic aspect of the formula, which insists 
upon one God. (p256) 
This was Boethius’ main concern in De Trinitate. And it marks an indisputable 
intersection between the notions of individuation and personhood. Gracia attributes 
what little attention was paid to the problem of individuality to a philosophical maturity, 
but also to some basic changes in the general outlook between the ancient and 
medieval worlds. Namely, “the progressive and continuous growth of an appreciation 
for the ontological status and value of the material world of sense perception, where 
individuality is most evident.”38 In other words, the doctrine of a monotheistic, triune 
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God gives individuality an importance which could not have arisen in ancient 
philosophy. 
To focus on the problem of individuation in the Middle Ages specifically, let us 
follow Gracia’s division between the early authors and the Scholastics. Just as it is in 
contemporary scholarship, in the Middle Ages there were two possible ways of 
approaching the philosophical issue of individuality: as a metaphysical issue, or an 
epistemic one. Most of the early authors, following Boethius and grappling with 
Trinitarian theological concerns, restricted their focus to the metaphysical question of 
individuation. These authors discuss the ontological status of the principle, but do not 
exhibit semantic concerns with, for example, the function of proper names or indexicals. 
(That being said, the epistemic approach does have medieval roots. Abelard, being the 
most exemplary author, did present preliminary concerns with the logical and linguistic 
issues related to individuality.)39 
Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham are typically the primary thinkers to be considered 
in discussion of this philosophical shift. They do provide a representative sample, sans 
Henry, of what happened during that time. But it is not exhaustive and comparisons 
with other thinkers, like Henry, helps us further refine the accuracy of the standard 
model. Rather than a few dominant voices projecting change, the Universities of the 
High Middle Ages were full of passionate and diverse voices that contributed to the 
evolving conversation- Henry’s among them. Most of the thinkers of the time were 
invested in reconciling Aristotle with the previously available texts, based in large part 
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on Plato, Augustine, and Boethius. The ways in which they attempt to do that, however, 
as well as the impact their attempts have had, varies greatly from writer to writer. 
Henry is hesitant about the rush his colleagues made towards Aristotle, and in an 
attempt to carefully and conservatively contribute to the ongoing dialogue around him, 
he too seeks reconciliation.  
Here, the discussion is almost entirely based on the textual tradition begun by 
Boethius. This tradition contains Boethius’ Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, his 
theological treatise De Trinitate, and to a lesser extent, his Commentaries on Aristotle’s 
Categories and De Interpretatione. As Gracia reminds us, “Boethius’ texts, including the 
key passages from Porphyry and Aristotle he translated, constitute the historical origin 
and source of all subsequent discussions of individuation until the translations from 
Arabic begin to appear…”40 For this reason, I shall limit my own contextual background 
discussion to the writings of Boethius, rather than extending the tradition to include 
Augustine and Plotinus as well.  
Amongst those thinkers who have been concerned with the problem of 
individuation, there is a shared metaphysical intuition about the place of objects in our 
world. First, an individual thing/object is distinct from all other entities. (Even those 
which are of the same specific kind) Second, they lose their fundamental character if 
they are divided into parts. Third, individuals are one of a group class (or type) which has 
or can have several members. Fourth, they remain the same through time and various 
                                                           
40 Gracia, 1984. p.13. 
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changes, and lastly, are not predicated of other things.41 The intuition may be 
immediate and shared, but the implications of the possible conflicts are not. From a 
philosophical perspective, if one is concerned with the claim that sameness or similarity 
is basic to class/type, how does one also account for individual difference within the 
class? Yet, if difference is taken, contrarily, to be fundamental in such instances, how 
might one account for the similarity between class members? So too do problems arise 
from the individual’s apparent inability to be divided, its enduring capacity across time 
and change, or the epistemic nuances of distinction? These are all problems with 
individuation, writ large, but when they were applied to the issue of person in the 
Middle Ages, they took on a unique problematic structure- specifically since they were 
applied to both human and divine persons. For, human persons are subject to the 
corporeal implications of their existence, but divine persons have a different nature, if 
nothing else, by virtue of being creator as opposed to created. 
Whether metaphysical or epistemic, Gracia organizes the philosophical task of 
accounting for individuation according to seven separate issues: the intention of 
individuality, the extension of individuality, the ontological status of individuality, the 
principle of individuation42, the discernibility of individuals, the function of proper 
names and indexicals, and the principle of the identity of indiscernibles.43  
 
                                                           
41 Traditional Aristotle.  
42   To clarify, the nature of an individual is an issue different from how a species gets individuated. My 
thesis concerns the nature of the individual. 
43 Gracia, 1994. p.21.  
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A. The Intention of Individuality 
Being one of the few authors to address the topic, Boethius’ texts become the 
bases for medieval notions of individuality. In his Commentary on the “Isagoge” 
Boethius posits four different ways of understanding what is meant by individuality. 
Something can properly be said to be individual if (1) it is indivisible into integral parts, 
(2) it is indivisible into specific or generic parts, including things belonging to the same 
species or genus, (3) it is not predicable of many, and (4) it has the quality of being non-
transferable.  
In the Commentary of Aristotle’s “Categories” he distinguishes between 
individuality (as indivisibility) and particularity (as impredicability).  In the Commentary 
of Aristotle’s “De Interpretatione” (the second edition) he presents a metaphysical view 
of individuality as incommunicability. And, as eluded to above, he treats the subject as 
referring to numerical difference in De Trinitate. Gracia notes “Most early medievals 
failed to see that individuality has to do primarily with non-instantiability or, as later 
scholastics put it, incommunicability.”44  
 Hence, having inherited this tradition, we understand the assumptions Henry 
makes about individual as an ‘individuum’ standing under a universal. And furthermore, 
why he dismisses it as separate from his discussion of incommunicability. Yet we can 
also see how he represents a shifting away from the established treatment by 
concerning himself, not just with the intension of the term, but the extension as well. 
                                                           
44 Gracia, 1994. p.262.  
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B. The Extension of Individuality 
The extension of individuality concerns which type or category of things the term 
refers. Early medieval authors can be described only either as moderate realists (or 
alternatively moderate nominalists) or just as nominalists. There are no strong realists in 
the thirteenth century, in the Platonic sense, who hold that nothing that exists is 
individual. The sobering influence of Aristotle and the Christian ideas concerning the 
persons and creation certainly seem to have had their effect in this period. (p263) 
C. The Ontological Status of Individuality 
This issue regards the metaphysical categorization of ‘individuation’ and only 
becomes a point of interest in the later Middle Ages. ‘The problem we face with regard 
to the issue of the ontological status of individuality is that there is just not enough 
evidence on the basis of which to reach definite conclusions about what most early 
medieval authors thought in this respect.’45  
D. The Principle of Individuation 
This is the aspect of the problem of individuality that concerned early, and for 
that matter later as well, medieval authors the most. None of them used the terms 
‘principle’ or ‘cause’, in discussions of this problem. This sort of terminology was 
introduced only in the thirteenth century and became standard subsequently. …Instead 
of asking about the ‘principle’ or the ‘cause’ of individuation, they asked about what 
‘made’ things individual. Most early authors adhered to the view, developed from 
                                                           
45 Gracia, 1994. p.265.  
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Porphyry through Boethius, that what makes an Aristotelian primary substance 
individual and numerically different was the variety of accidents present in the 
substance.  
The issue can be presented as follows: If one interprets individuality primarily as 
distinction from others, or as was called by many at the time, ‘difference’, it appears 
quite obvious that the easiest way to account for such difference is to point to some 
feature or features which set the individual apart from other individuals. What they 
failed to see, however, was that individuality may not consist only, or even primarily, in 
difference. Individuality above everything else seems to have to do with non-
instantiability. ‘Difference, as later scholastics were going to see clearly, is more an 
accompanying feature of individuality than its defining feature.’46  
E. The Discernibility of Individuals 
Unlike the Contemporary situation, where discernibility is often given 
precedence in the subject, medieval authors did not regard the issue of individuality as 
separate from discernibility. Their metaphysical approach left this matter largely 
untouched.47   
Like discernibility, the function of proper names and indexicals was not 
addressed in the Middle Ages, except by those who adopted a purely 
                                                           
46 Gracia, 1994. p. 270. 
47 Ibid., pp.270-271.  
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logical/grammatical approach. Abelard does distinguish between universals and what is 
designated by proper names. But even his discussion is limited.  
Yet, again, our analysis of article 53, question 1 exhibits some hint of just this sort of 
concern shown by Henry. He is beginning to draw distinctions between the 
grammatical/linguistic implications of the terms and the metaphysical necessities for 
which they are said to relate. 
F. The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles   
The metaphysical formulation is as follows: 
If x has the same characteristics as y, then x is identical with y. (Metaphysical principle of 
identity) 
If x and y are not identical, then x does have the same characteristics as y. (translated 
into a more contemporary format.) 
The epistemic formulation is as follows: 
If x is indiscernible (or indistinguishable) from y, then x is identical with y. (epistemic 
because it involves the epistemic notion of indiscernibility, of which identity is the 
result.) 
39 
If x is indiscernible (or indistinguishable) from y, then x is the same object as y (where 
object is considered an epistemic entity, not a thing.) (modified for proper 
proportion*)48  
How medieval philosophers address these issues varies greatly between the 
early and later authors of the period. As philosophical positions shift away from realism 
and towards nominalism, we see a growing interest in the problem of individuation in its 
own right. “Indeed, in the thirteenth century and later we find a slow but concerted 
effort to distinguish individuality from numerical difference and to separate the logical 
notion of a subject (impredicable) and predicate (predicable) from the metaphysical 
notions of individual (incommunicable) and universal (communicable.)”49 By the close of 
the twelfth century, the early medieval standard theory of individuation has all but 
disappeared.  
 The reintroduction of Aristotle to the Latin West, coupled with 
challenging theological demands, leads to a progressive discussion of the problem in the 
thirteenth century. The Aristotelian tradition, as interpreted by those who adopted that 
perspective, posits the aim of science in general and philosophy in particular as the 
identification of causes and principles. As Gracia summarizes, “to know something 
scientifically is to be able to identify the causes that brought it about and the principles 
that play a role in its makeup. Thus, to know individuality is to be able to determine the 
                                                           
48 Gracia, 1994. pp.274-275. 
49 Gracia, 1994. p.276. 
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causes and principles that are responsible for it.”50 This is what most scholastic authors 
understood as the central issue concerning individuation.  
As Gracia also argues, there are differences in the philosophical implications to 
each aspect of the problem. The first, that of the intention of individuality, is a logical 
one. (This has to do with the clarification of concepts, through the ability of 
understanding and distinguishing.) The second, third, and fourth aspects are 
metaphysical in nature, for they are concerned with the proper description of reality. 
The fifth issue, however, is epistemic, as it considers the conditions for the possibility of 
the discernment of individuals. Whereas, the sixth and final issue contained within this 
problem is conceptual. We will see in the chapters to come that Henry takes each of 
these six issues into account when providing his own philosophical treatment of the 
divine persons.  
When categorized into Gracia’s framework, one can easily see with which 
aspects of the problem different philosophical traditions have been concerned. For 
example, one might read the more modern, logical positivist movement as focused little 
upon the metaphysical issues, but rather, as homing in on the epistemic, logical, and 
linguistic aspects instead. While one might point to the traditional metaphysician as 
having only addressed the second, third, and fourth dilemmas, while ignoring the 
others. When reflecting upon the problem in the High Middle Ages, most scholars have 
focused their attention to the treatment of the fourth issue- that of the cause or 
principle of the phenomenon. Gracia states that this is because “up to the fourteenth 
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century, one seldom finds a careful and clear distinction between these six issues and 
much more effort is put into the solution of the fourth than into the solution of the 
others.”51  
The solution to the problem of individuation, in 13th century Scholasticism 
specifically, depends to a great extent on (1) the interpretation of individuality, (2) the 
things considered to be individual, and (3) the ontological status accorded to 
individuality in the individual.  
If individuality is interpreted as the relation of difference or distinction among 
things, then the principle of individuation must consist in whatever makes individual 
things different or distinct from one another. But, on the other hand, if individuality is 
interpreted as indivisibility into units similar in nature to the original, then the principle 
of individuation must be what accounts for such lack of division and not necessarily for 
difference or distinction. If everything is individual, including the accidents of 
Aristotelian primary substances, such as the hair color of a man or the weight of a cat, 
the principles that go to make something individual would probably be different than if 
the term ‘individual’ extended only to primary substances. Likewise, a difference arises 
when physical and nonphysical entities are considered, as opposed to restricting the 
extension to physical entities alone. (For example, matter could be a candidate in the 
latter case, but would prove insufficient for the former.) And the reason for the third is 
                                                           
51 Gracia, 1994. p.21.  
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that Ontological status matters because it is one thing to account for a real feature in a 
thing and another to account for a concept in the mind. )52  
As for Henry, we must ask- where does he fit into this historical tradition? He 
most certainly inherited the tradition of Boethius via Abelard. But, teaching at the time 
and place he did, he also represents those High Medieval thinkers who attempted to 
reconcile the traditional stance on individuation with the newly reintroduced issues of 
Aristotelianism. And so, his is a unique and interesting position in light of how he treats 
the term ‘individuum’ in the first question of article 53 of his Summa. 
 
  
                                                           




HENRY’S TREATMENT OF RELATION 
Aristotle began a discussion of metaphysics in ancient Greece roughly three 
hundred years before the Common Era.  In his philosophy he understood the notion of 
relation as a categorical accident; an arbitrary attribute that is somehow tacked onto 
the substance, but not an essential part of it.  As a consequence of Aristotle’s analysis, 
the notion of relation was not of great concern in his metaphysics because it was not 
conceived of as having any real necessity for particular beings.   Take, for example, the 
statement that ‘Socrates is as white as Plato’.  If the more Aristotelian notion of relation 
were applied to this statement, then the fact that Socrates is ‘as white as’ Plato has 
nothing to do with the substance of Socrates but is a merely accidental attribute.  If, for 
example, Socrates were to have been born lighter than Plato, his substance, namely 
being a rational animal, would be no different. 
Medieval theories of relation are less well known than ancient ones.  What 
happened in the medieval universities when Aristotle’s Metaphysics was re-introduced 
to the Latin West?  At this point thinkers in the Latin West became acutely aware of 
Aristotle’s notion of relation and many thinkers in the Faculty of Arts quickly embraced 
all of Aristotle’s ideas.  But not every thinker simply accepted Aristotle’s analyses 
without critique.  
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Henry was regent master in the theology faculty in Paris from 1276 to his death 
in 1293, and of course, much of his analysis of relation is driven by his religious 
concerns, but one can and must distinguish the admittedly theological issues which 
prompted Henry’s analyses from his theory of relation, which is decidedly philosophical 
and surprisingly “modern.” 
Metaphysics applies, according to Aristotle himself, to all beings.  For Henry, a 
Christian theologian in the Augustinian tradition, God is a triune being in unity, and 
beings can be either created or uncreated, but according to Henry what Aristotle 
maintains about relation does not adequately account for a triune God in unity and for 
uncreated being.  Consequently, Henry attempts to modify the Aristotelian 
metaphysical notion of relation, and in turn, that modification becomes a catalyst for 
the development of his own unique metaphysics; a metaphysics which would serve as a 
“worthy alternative to Thomism”53 during his time and a significant contribution to the 
ongoing philosophical conversation on esse for years to follow.   
To provide a coherent discussion of Henry’s modification of the Aristotelian 
conception of relation, this section will address (I.) Aristotle’s notion of relation, (II.) the 
medieval context, (III.) the reasons Henry attempts to modify Aristotle’s notion of 
relation, and (IV.) Henry’s own analysis of the term “relation”, especially where it 
applies to the Trinity.  
 
                                                           




Aristotle deals with the notion of relation in three different books: The 
Categories, The Metaphysics, and The Physics.  As mentioned in the introduction, 
Aristotle claimed that metaphysics should apply to all beings.  A critical aspect of his 
metaphysical system is his notion of the categorical accidents, tools used to classify 
beings. These categories are coincidental attributes ‘inhering in’ a substance or esse, or 
being, as foundation.  These accidents, according to Aristotle, are distinct from the 
substance of a thing, and are additional aspects of generation and corruption.   
Because categorical relations are dependent upon other categories as their 
foundation and because the relation of a thing does not necessarily determine the 
nature of that thing, Aristotle places relation as the least of all extra-mental realities 
(summa genera/ ens debilissimum).   For example, if a person were to say that “Socrates 
is more white than Plato”, what would that statement actually imply?  Is the substance 
of either Socrates or Plato necessarily impacted by the relationship “more white than” 
which is outside of the mind?  If Socrates gets a tan, Plato would then become whiter 
than Socrates.  However, the essence of neither would be changed and Plato, in this 
example, has not changed at all.  This obvious uncertainty is difficult in a system which 
seeks universals, and one can understand the reason Aristotle may have wished to 
subordinate the notion in some way.  His hierarchical description of categories implies 
that substantial being is more fundamental than qualitative or quantitative being and 
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anything ‘accidental’.   Thus, for Aristotle’s metaphysical structure, relation could never 
work as a central point of importance.  
In Metaphysics, Book V, c.15 , (a chapter Mark Henninger refers to as “a lexicon 
of philosophical terms”),  Aristotle lays out his highly nuanced threefold division of 
relation as an accident.  He divides the category of relation into 1) numerical relations of 
identity (‘as white as’, ‘twice as much as’), 2) causal relations (‘cutting-cut’, ‘acting-acted 
upon’), and 3) psychological relations (‘knowing subject-object known’, ‘measure-
measured thing’).   
In the first case, that of identity, the basis of the relation is unity or plurality (as 
pertaining to substance, quality, or quantity ) and is a numerical relation between two 
extremes.  Therefore, most medieval thinkers viewed this subdivision of relation as real 
and mutual.    
The second subdivision, causal relation, was also interpreted as real and mutual 
because the two extremes belong to different categories but the same categorical ordo.  
The basis for this case is active or passive potency.   
The third category, the psychological, is perhaps the most complex.  This relation 
is unlike the first two types of relations, in that it is non-mutual and only real in one of 
the two extremes, because the extremes belong to different categorical ordo.   This 
implies that, in this third case, dependency as a result of the relation may apply to only 
one of the two extremes.   
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In the Physics, Book V, ch.2, Aristotle maintains that there is no “motion in 
respect of relation: for it may happen that when one correlative changes, the other, 
although this does not itself change, is no longer applicable, so that in these cases the 
motion is accidental.”  For example, suppose that at t1 Socrates is taller than Plato.  
Then at t2 Plato becomes as tall as Socrates.  By t3, Plato is taller than Socrates.  This 
change in the relation between Socrates and Plato is not motion, but rather, the results 
of generation and corruption. This claim is not surprising, considering Aristotle’s 
ordering principle of kinesis, or motion.  When Aristotle maintains that there can be ‘no 
motion in respect to relation’, this caused no problem with his theory of an Unmoved 
Mover because motion requires contraries existing on a scale within one single 
immovable being.    
In the Categories, ch.7, Aristotle distinguishes relation from the other categories, 
chiefly substance, quality, and quantity.  It is important to keep in mind here that his 
agenda is to characterize relations on a semantic/logical level .  He seems to maintain 
that no substance can ever be relative.  (“Those things are called relative, which, being 
either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by 
reference to that other thing.” )  Aristotle goes on to provide two additional definitions.  
The first is that “those things only are properly called relative in case of which relation 
to an external object is a necessary condition of existence”  and the second is that “we 
call that a relative in the case of which relation to something is a necessary condition of 
existence.”    
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This may seem to be a puzzling understanding of relation to the modern reader, 
because the term has developed into being thought of as residing between two 
substances.  However, for Aristotle (as well as medieval thinkers), the accidental 
category is understood to be an item that inheres within a particular given substance as 
an extra-mental reality (opposed to a relation of reason).  Medieval philosophers seem 
to share this understanding in a strict way.  For every distinct substance, there must be a 
distinct set of accidents.   For Aristotle, this is being-towards-something (ta pros ti; Latin 
equivalent, esse ad aliquid, or accidental being). 
Aristotle’s logical definition of relation is in reference to another thing, the “ad 
aliquid”.  This implies that it may contain contraries (virtue and vice), variation of degree 
(like and unlike), and simultaneous correlatives.  His ontological definition implies that 
relation is a necessary condition of existence. 
Although Aristotle’s notion of relation may seem complex, it is simple in 
comparison to the discussion concerning relation that would follow him in the High 
Middle Ages.  In proportion to the subjects of his writing, Aristotle devotes very little 
space to relation.  But, he devotes enough to ignite a spark.  That spark was re-
introduced to the thinkers of the Latin West at a very interesting time.   
The Need for Modification 
The discussion of the medieval conversation of relatio, relation, requires context.  
Thinkers in the Middle Ages understood Aristotle in a certain way, through the lens of 
interpretation. That interpretation must be understood before one can fully grasp the 
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authority it was given.  Added to that is the environment in which this interpretation 
was being analyzed.  These thinkers were not only interpreting Aristotle; they were 
interpreting him in the context of a culture on the brink of enormous change. 
During the 12th and 13th centuries, Christian theologians were struggling with the 
arrival of Aristotelian philosophy, which had been reintroduced to the Latin West by 
Muslim scholars.54  At this point, two major events were happening in the West.  On one 
hand, the rise of the Catholic Church was calling for a solidification of Christian doctrine 
including an accepted understanding of a monotheistic, yet triune, God.  On the other 
hand, the rise of the universities produced scholars who were calling for a more 
thorough study of secular philosophical texts to supplement the previously studied texts 
of the Bible and Peter Lombard’s books on the Sentences55. 
So, for Henry of Ghent, a secular master of theology teaching at the university in 
Paris from around 1276 to 1293 (and writing theology for the Catholic Church)56, the 
challenge became to “…address in a manner congenial to reason and revelation the 
non-Christian philosophy, particularly Aristotle and his commentators.”57  This task, 
although complex, is representative of a shift taking place in religious and philosophic 
scholasticism.  Henry, along with his contemporaries, could have ignored the 
                                                           
54 Medieval philosophers, when mentioning Aristotle, often refer to ‘the Philosopher and his 
Commentator.’  Generally, the Commentator referred to is Averroes.  (Boethius also wrote commentaries 
on Aristotle; there were also Greek commentaries on his works; and Grosseteste and other anonymous 
commentaries on Aristotle’s Ethics also circulated in the Middle Ages.) 
55 Lombard’s book on the Sentences became the main teaching text for Theology. 
56 Henry of Ghent (appointed by the Bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier) sat on the commission for the 
Condemnation of 1277 (March 7th), in which the bishop of Paris condemned two hundred and twenty 
philosophical positions. 
57 J.C. FLORES, Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity, p.2. 
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Aristotelian writings and structured a metaphysics that would fit neatly into the spiritual 
status quo, rather than trying to account for both.  Instead, the philosophical 
conversation attempted reconciliation. 
Aristotle’s notion of relation seemed inadequate for medieval thinkers committed to 
certain religious beliefs.  Specifically, there were difficulties with (1) Aristotle’s belief 
that relation was an accident, (2) the fact that Aristotle’s account of relation seemed to 
deny any special providence by God, and (3) Aristotle’s unmoved mover was 
necessitarian. It was not a free Creator.58   
(1) Henry felt that Aristotle’s notion of relation was inadequate in accounting for 
uncreated beings because in Aristotle’s system relation is an ‘accident.’  As a 
metaphysical category, relation must apply to all beings (both created and uncreated).  
As an accident, relation implies contingency.  For a Christian theologian like Henry, there 
is obviously a relational aspect to the Trinity (God the Father and God the Son).59  But 
                                                           
58 Divine simplicity is part of a well-established tradition in the Middle Ages. An issue for Christian, Jewish, 
and Islamic thinkers alike, it has ancient roots. When the Platonic notion of divine transcendence was 
inherited alongside the Aristotelian notion of God as a fully actualized intellect, the result was a Medieval 
conception of the divine as pure and unlimited being. For thinkers like Avicenna and Maimonides this 
purity implied an absolute unity which excludes the possibility of internal divisions. When Avicenna states 
“It is not possible that the true nature whose existence is necessary be composed of a multitude at all…” 
(Avicenna 1973) he is referring to the divine as the only essence that is necessarily one with existence and 
can have nothing superadded to it. Maimonides, in a similar manner, conceives of God as a subject about 
whom we can predicate nothing. “He, may he be exalted, is one in all respects; no multiplicity should be 
posited in Him…” (Maimonides 1963) Predication imposes limitation upon a subject, by implying that the 
subject is one thing or another, and thus cannot be properly applied to God. The divine, then, necessarily 
lacks accidents/attributes. (Pessin 2016)  
59 “According to Christian doctrine of the Trinity, God exists in three persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
As this doctrine was typically understood during the Middle Ages, it implied not only that God possesses 
certain relations—such as fatherhood and sonship—but also that he possess them independently of the 
activity of any mind. As Aquinas says in his Summa Theologiae: Someone is said to be a father only by 
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the relations “son of” and “father of” are not accidents for the Christian Trinitarian. The 
Trinity cannot contain contingency, as this would be to imply an imperfection in God 
which is unworthy of him60.   
The medieval doctrine of divine simplicity argues for the understanding that any 
relation between God and his intrinsic or essential attributes would need to be 
necessary and not contingent, because there is no real distinction to be drawn between 
God and any of his intrinsic or essential attributes.  God is simple.  God’s attributes 
should not be understood as a pie-chart, having compartmentalized aspects. Augustine 
points out in book V of his De Trinitate that there arises a special difficulty for those who 
want to combine this understanding with the Christian doctrine of creation. For this 
doctrine would seem to require that God first lacks, and then acquires a contingent or 
accidental relation—namely, that of being creator.61  
If relatio (relation) implies contingency and imperfection is an accident, and if one 
believes in an uncreated being outside of the realm of accidents which has an essential 
relation built into it (a triune God), then how can a metaphysics be structured?  Henry’s 
solution to this question aims at the ‘accidental’ part of Aristotle’s theory.  Although this 
is an important problem Henry needed to address, it is not the only one.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
virtue of his fatherhood, and someone is said to be a son only by virtue of his sonship. Therefore, if [the 
relations of] fatherhood and sonship are not really in God, it follows that God is not a Father or Son really, 
but merely according to a concept of the mind- which is the Sabellian heresy.” Stanford Encyclopedia.edu. 
60 HENRY OF GHENT, Summa, art.32, q.5: “Sed hoc ignobilitatis est, et tale, ut habitum est supra, maxime Deo 
repugnant. Ergo etc.” 
61 Translations of Augustine have been taken from two sources: M.T. CLARK. "De Trinitate." The Cambridge 
Companion to Augustine, and A. W. HADDAN. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers.  
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(2) If Aristotle is correct, God’s special providence is also questionable, if not 
impossible.  Aristotle believed that beings are substances.  According to his own notion 
of relation (aside from the consequences of an accidental attribute), the primary 
substance could not be related to this world at all, because this would expose the 
primary substance to generation and corruption.  If applied to the Christian God, that 
would imply that God, the primary being, could have no knowledge of the lives of his 
creatures and God’s providence could not be accounted for.  Furthermore, God would 
not be able to intervene in the affairs of this world.   
This would eliminate the ability for miracles and personal relationships with the 
divine.  Henry would not have been comfortable with this, because he saw the nature of 
God as a twofold self-recognition through divine intelligence (thought) and divine will 
(love), which implies awareness.  The Christian God is not only aware of the lives of his 
creatures, but also engaged with them through prayer and sacrifice.  In fact, according 
to Henry, the existence of creatures depends on an exemplar, or idea, in the mind of 
God.  For Henry, humans are reflections of God, and thus, are very much related in that 
regard. 
(3) This develops into another problem which Henry finds in Aristotle’s notion of 
relation: the problem of God’s creation as necessary. (This is a different concern than in 
the first problem, which was a Trinitarian concern.) This is a problem Henry found in not 
only Aristotle, but also Latin Averroism.62 Henry maintains 1) the Trinity is a triune, yet 
                                                           
62 Unlike Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Datia, Henry was hesitant of the quick acceptance of Latin 
Averroism by his colleagues, especially on the point of necessity.  The idea that creation implied necessity 
 
53 
monotheistic, divinity that is not capable of containing contingent attributes, yet 
encompasses real relations between three distinct persons, and 2) creation is the 
spiritual action of a knowing and loving God who is aware of his creatures without being 
essentially changed by them (as addressed in the previous paragraph).  These create a 
need in his thought for further distinctions of real relations that will allow for a 
difference applied to each extreme63 involved in the relation.   
Basically, Henry needs creatures to be reflections of and thus dependent upon God, 
but he needs God to be independent from the contingency of his creatures.  God cannot 
be altered by the act of creation. Nor does Henry believe that creatures are necessary 
beings; God, and even God as creator, is not dependent on creatures.  According to 
Aristotle, two extremes or relata are needed to establish a relation.  So, to claim that “a 
is related to b” (aRb) where “a” and “b” are the terms or extremes that establish a 
relationship “R”, the relation needs both extremes.  If “Socrates is the father of Plato”, 
the relation “is father of” needs both terms or extremes; i.e. both Socrates and Plato.  
But, to claim that “God is the creator of humans”, Henry wants to avoid claiming that 
the relation “is creator of” requires humans.  For Henry, God is completely free in 
creating humans. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to God was condemned not only in 1277, but also earlier, in 1270.  In the earlier condemnation, also 
carried out by Tempier, thirteen averroistic propositions were considered to be erroneous; including the 
proposition that God does not know individual things, there never was a first man, and human affairs are 
not regulated by the Providence of God. The Condemnation of 1277 furthered the attacks on Latin 
Averroism: proposition #22. that God cannot be the cause of a newly made thing and cannot produce 
anything new; #28. that from one first agent there cannot proceed a multiplicity of effects, #20. that God 
of necessity makes whatever comes immediately from Him. (HYMAN & WALSH, Philosophy in the Middle 
Ages: The Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions, pp.584-591).  




Henry’s theological concerns do not fit into the systematic approach of Aristotle as 
is.  When addressing Henry’s criticism of Aristotle and Averroes, Flores points out that to 
Henry, “these thinkers ground their conclusions in their observation of nature.  
Accordingly, they envision generation solely in terms of natural change and the will 
solely as a principle of acting and making.  Thus, they failed to see how there can be a 
communication of nature by intellect and will.”64  Thus, a modification is needed. 
Henry’s Discussion of Relation 
How does Henry suggest we should think about the notion of relation, if it is 
different from Aristotle’s notion?  According to available scholarly editions, Henry first 
addresses the notion of relation in Quodlibet III, question 4, in the year 127865.  (Notice 
that this is one year after he participated in the Condemnation of 1277.  Henry has just 
spent a considerable amount of time engaged in Aristotle’s writings, and has certainly 
devoted time to finding limits with reference to theology in his thought.)   
In this question Henry discusses Avicenna’s argument that different modes of 
being can be combined, so that substantial being could be combined with relational 
being and accidental being.  Because relation becomes so important in his system, 
Henry deals with it in many different places.  The primary discussion of relation seems 
to be in his Summa, article 32, question 5, c.1279-80.66  However, aspects can also be 
                                                           
64 J.C. FLORES, Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity, p.132. 
65 J. DECORTE, Avicenna’s Ontology of Relation, p.9.  Cf. HENRICI DE GANDAVO, Quod. III, q.4 (ed. 1518, f. 51rN).  
See also Decorte, Avicenna’s Ontology of Relation, p.11, n.38. 
66 The Summa is divided by articles containing questions.  The Quodlibeta are divided by question. 
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seen throughout his Quodlibeta67.  However, before discussing that particular text, an 
examination of Henry’s overall metaphysics is needed.  Henry’s analysis of relation is 
articulated through a web of very technical terms, each of which will be addressed 
separately below.  Considering this discussion, the problems examined in section III 
(Henry’s problems with the Aristotelian notion) will be revisited.  
As mentioned previously, Henry modifies Aristotle’s notion of relation, making 
relation a central aspect of his thought. His notion of relation resides within a very 
complex understanding of esse.  Henry uses five terms when discussing relation.  These 
are: (1) res (‘thing’), (2) fundamentum (‘base’), (3) modus (‘mode’), (4) respectus 
(‘respect’), and (5) ratio (‘notion’).  Each of these five terms have very technical 
meanings and each must be understood. 
1. Res 
In the process of constructing a metaphysical system, Henry begins by thinking of 
reality in the very broadest sense possible.  Res, or thing, is this starting point for 
Henry68.  Res is the most fundamental metaphysical category that contains all others69.  
The broadest sense of res is only opposed to that which is pure nothing (purum nihil).  
From this fundamental category of res/thing there are three subcategories, having a 
common center.   
                                                           
67 For a list of these teachings, see Henninger, p.42, n.5.  
68 S. P. MARRONE, Truth and Scientific Knowledge. pp.108-110. 
69 Henry draws out his ideas on the categories in Summa, art.32, q.5; Quod. V, q.2; Quod.VII, q.1-2. 
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The first, broadest field is the category itself: that which could have being (ens) and 
that which could not have being (non ens).  Henry refers to this category as ‘res a reor 
reris’ because of his assumption that the term derived etymologically from reor, reris “to 
think.”  In Quodlibet VII, questions 1 and 2, Henry gives the example of a “golden 
mountain”70.  One could conceptualize of a golden mountain, because one has 
experienced gold and one has experienced mountains, even though those concepts 
would never join as an actualized being.  (Aristotle’s example of this same issue 
concerns a “goat-stag.”71)  This category is esse as an imaginary concept. 
The second, more restricted field than the first, consists of ‘things’ that could have 
actual existence in the world.  Henry refers to this category as ‘res a ratitudine’.  
Ratitudine etymologically refers to ratitudo, “rational thought.”  The being of this 
category either possesses or relates to an exemplar in the mind of God, which is the 
origin of all creation.  This category is esse as essence. 
The third, most restricted field of the three consists only of those things which do 
have actual existence in the world.  This category is referred to as ‘res existens in actu’.  
‘Res existens in actu’, then, is esse as existence.72  The ‘res’ of this category includes all 
the unique characteristics and accidents of the individuated being.  
 Take for example the statement ‘Socrates is the father of Plato.’  Henry believes 
the res of this statement to be the actual existing beings of Socrates and Plato as 
                                                           
70 HENRY OF GHENT, Quod.VII, qq. 1 and 2 (I, 258rB). 
71 ARISTOTLE, Posterior Analytics, II, 7. 
72 For other equally useful discussions of ‘res’ in Henry’s thought, see Flores, p.165, n. 44; pp.181-184 and 
Henninger, p.43-44; 48-52. 
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individuals (including all the qualities and quantities that make them distinctly 
themselves). It is the idea of ‘this man’ and ‘this man’ directly.   
2. Fundamentum 
At this point, Henry has distinguished between essence (essentia) and existence 
(existens). Henry’s next task of modification is to address the issue of foundation, or 
base (fundamentum).  This is a very important yet very complicated issue for his 
metaphysics.  
The fundament is understood by Henry as the qualities or quantities upon which 
any particular relation is founded; so that something may be white (an accident, namely, 
a quality) and in addition, it may be similar to another white thing (a relation).  In the 
statement ‘Socrates is as white as Plato’, the ‘as white as’ is the relation.  But, if there 
are no white things except for Socrates, then, for Henry, the fundament, i.e. white, still 
exists even though the relation ‘as white as’ does not.  (This is a point on which Scotus 
heavily criticizes Henry.73) 
3. Modus 
The concepts of ‘thing’ and ‘foundation’ lead into Henry’s use of mode (modus) 
which concerns actual existence. Instead of asking whether the diverse res of different 
categories can be transferred to God, Henry asks whether the “modes” of being of the 
                                                           
73 See J. Decortes’ article, Modus or Res: Scotus’ Criticism of Henry of Ghent’s Conception of the Reality of 
a Real Relation for a further discussion of Scotus’ criticism.  
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different categories can be attributed to God.74 Thus, mode of being becomes a crucial 
tenet within the metaphysics of Henry’s thought.  In fact, in his book on Relations, Mark 
Henninger entitles his chapter about Henry: ‘Relation as Mode of Being.’75   
Henry’s emphasis upon modal distinction cannot be overstated.  J. Decorte 
demonstrates this significance in the conclusion of his article on Henry’s metaphysical 
notions of relation and substance by saying that “since all creation is dependent upon a 
Creator, and since that Creator is a tri-unity, all creation and the Creator are in an 
eminent way relational.  Relatedness is a mode of being of all that is; indeed, it is the 
primary mode of being of all that is.  Hence, no metaphysics can do without relation.”76  
One is reminded of Hegel, who claimed that one cannot define being without the notion 
of relation.  
In the statement “God is the creator of Plato”, the phrase “is creator of” is really 
expressing a mode of being. With a mode of being, relata or the extremes (in this case, 
God and Plato) are not both needed to establish the relation “is creator of” because in 
this example, Plato is not required for God to be a creator. God, in Henry’s thought, is 
not dependent on creatures. Mode may be best understood when discussed along with 
respect (respectus).   
 
 
                                                           
74 HENRY OF GHENT, Summa, article 32, question 5. 
75 M. HENNINGER, Relations, c.3. 




Juan Carlos Flores describes Henry’s notion of respect by contrasting it with that of 
relation: 
“…even though both relation and respect signify ‘being toward another’ (ad 
aliud esse), the relative name (relation) ‘father’ can be predicated of that to 
which it is related, while the respective name (respectus) ‘paternity’ cannot 
be predicated of that to which it is related.  A father is the father of the son, 
but his paternity is not the paternity of the filiation.  Thus, respectus signifies, 
strictly speaking, relatedness toward something, regardless of whether the 
name bespeaks the foundation as well (as some names of respectus do).  
Only if the respectus is also a name of the foundation related as well as of its 
relatedness can the respectus be called relatio.”77 
In this example ‘paternity’ is the respectus, which is different from the relation ‘is 
father of…’  To illustrate this further, one can carry this example out and apply it to a 
situation of multiple siblings.  The relation “is father of” establishes the “respectus” with 
the first child, but once established by the first child, subsequent children do not add 
additional “respects”.  And furthermore, should any of the multiple children pass out of 
actual existence, the “respectus” would remain unaltered. 
In his discussion of this same subject matter, Jos Decorte claims that “Using the 
name relatio in a proper sense, however, we can no longer say that both (relatio and 
respectus) can be used interchangeably: for although every relatio is a respectus, not 
every respectus is a relatio.”78  With regards to the above distinction between ‘paternity’ 
and ‘fatherhood’, Decorte cites Henry’s Summa, article 35: “Whereas ‘father’ is both 
                                                           
77 J.C. FLORES, Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity p.163. 
78 J. DECORTE, Modus or Res, p.4. 
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relatio and respectus, ‘fatherhood’ is respectus and, strictly speaking, not relatio.”79  
Returning to the example given above about Socrates and Plato, ‘Socrates is the father 
of Plato’ the respectus of Socrates would be his paternity-ness and the respectus of 
Plato would be his filiation-ness. 
5. Ratio 
The mode of existing of participated being80 is considered the ratio (notional 
concept81, essential concept, definition).  As opposed to res, which is the material 
principle of each category of reality, ratio is the formal principle of each category.  The 
mode of existing of the divine is found as the self-act of knowing and loving; this is God’s 
ratio, or notional concept.  But existing created beings also have a ratio.  So that, if 
‘Socrates is the father of Plato’, the ratio, for Henry, would be the concept of Socrates 
and the concept of Plato.  
These five notions are critical to place Henry’s notion of relation within a coherent 
context.  As has been demonstrated, his notion of relation is not an isolated one, but is a 
notion working in conjunction with his other metaphysical notions so that his system 
can solve the problems needed to be addressed by him.   
IVb. Resolving Problems from Section III 
In light of understanding Henry’s system, let us now revisit the three problems 
mentioned earlier that Henry found within Aristotle’s notion of relation.   
                                                           
79 J. DECORTE, Modus or Res:, p.5 (See n. 19). 
80 M. HENNINGER, Relation, p.48 (See n. 25, regarding Quod. V, q.2). 
81 If notion is correct, nature is implied.   
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(1.) Relation as an accident By building his metaphysics in such a way that relation 
becomes essential to being, rather than accidental, Henry’s notion of relation can 
handle the problem which his Trinitarian beliefs posed for Aristotle’s analysis of relation.  
If relation is within being rather than tacked onto it as an accident, the relation of father 
and son within the Trinity does not imply any accidental attribute tacked onto God.   
  According to Henry, the Father generates first in the mode of intellect and is thus 
un-generated, while the Son proceeds as the Word of the intellect and the Holy Spirit as 
Love out of the will.82  Consequently, through this conversation between the divine 
intellect and the divine will, God is aware of himself as thought (through the Son) and 
loving that knowledge (through the Holy Spirit).  But, because these persons are still 
within the one God, they are distinct, not separate.  Thus, by creatively uniting the two 
most common methods for understanding the Trinity into a form of self-reflection, 
Henry establishes a Trinity of eternal spiritual action.  
(2.) Divine Providence: In Henry’s system God can have knowledge of particulars and 
have guidance over his creation without being corrupted because of the relational 
distinctions Henry has built into his system.  Because God has a different mode of being, 
ratio, and respectus than created beings have- the relation has different implications 
depending on which direction it is pointing towards.  Consequently, the creator and a 
created being may participate in a shared relationship, but one could understand the 
relationship as philosophically implying one thing for the creator and another thing for 
the created being.  The one relation can have different implications for each extreme in 
                                                           
82 J.C. FLORES, Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity, p.11. 
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the relation.  This understanding allows one to conceive of a difference in necessity 
between the extremes of the creator/created relation: where God may be able to 
influence beings that are in space and time without being exposed to space and time 
Himself.   
(3.) God’s creation as necessary: Henry believes his notion has solved this problem 
because God exists in the mode of being as creator, whether created beings are existing 
in actuality or not. (See Modus in Section IVa) An example of Henry’s philosophical 
concern is that the Aristotelian notion of relation, as Henry understood it, entailed that 
the statement ‘God is creator of Plato’ implies contingency to both extremes (God and 
Plato) participating in the relation (‘is creator of’).  
By removing relation from the accidental category and applying the five aspects 
discussed in section IVa, the statement ‘God is creator of Plato’ may be understood 
differently. Within Henry’s system, Plato (as an existing being) depends upon the 
relation. Plato must have this established relationship with God in order to ‘be created’. 
However, God, as ‘creator of’, does not depend upon the established relationship with 
Plato. God is creator whether or not this particular relation is established.  
Henry’s notion of relation is discussed here, because it demonstrates a metaphysical 
approach to the subject of the divine. This will later be contrasted with the approach 
that Henry takes to the notion of person in question 1 of article 53, which is decidedly 
epistemic. When considering the notion of relation, we see that Henry addressed the 
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nature of God through the lens of essence and accident.83 And although the subject 
matter of divine relation and the divine persons are inextricably linked, he treats the 
latter very differently. There, when discussing the divine persons, Henry considers the 
language we use to convey the meaning of persons and whether that meaning forms 
the proper concept in our minds for thinking about the divine. Henry’s comparison of 
specific terms, we will see, is different in each account. In the above section of relation, 
we see him comparing terms to build a metaphysical account of God’s triune nature. In 
question 1 of article 53, we will again see his consideration of specific terms, yet there, 
he contrasts them with the notion of person to demonstrate their fallibility in conveying 
the unique meaning which only the term ‘persona’ is able to convey. But before moving 
on to that discussion, let us consider the philosophical connections established thus far. 
I have now demonstrated the ways in which substance and relation took on new 
importance for philosophers and theologians in the Middle Ages. It was suggested by 
Saint Basil that an understanding of the Trinity lay more in understanding the types of 
relation existing between the three members of the Godhead than in the nature of the 
Persons themselves. But in fact, for Henry, the two concepts are philosophically linked.84 
This is because, according to Christian doctrine, the persons of the trinity exist in 
relation to each other as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. So, Henry maintains 
                                                           
83 For further insight into the significance of Henry’s notion of Relation, the Trinity, and Illumination, see 
Russell Friedman’s work in the two volume Brill series devoted to Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval 
University.  
84 See- Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae (Blackfriars, 1967) p.30 (note); cf St.Augustine The Trinity 
(Catholic University of America Press, 1963) p.180. Wikipedia contributors, "Relation (history of concept)," 
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Relation_(history_of_concept)&oldid=841385111 (accessed 
May 23, 2018). 
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that the divine persons are relations, essentially. And like the problem of universals, the 
philosophical question for the Scholastics was whether relations were real or only 
mental.  
Henry treats relation as a real feature of the divine. (Albeit introducing distinctions 
between the reality of the being and our understanding of it.) We should expect, then, 
that Henry will offer his own solution pertaining to personhood. As we will see, what 
separates the divine persons of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit while maintaining the 
divine unity of the Godhead, Henry argues, is a triune nature of incommunicability. The 
Father is a person in relationship with himself as Father to the Son and distinct from the 
Son by virtue of an incommunicability. Incommunicability, an essence of unutterable 
being, suggests a relation of communication. Some aspect of the Father’s nature is 
incommunicable to the Son, and vice versa. They are whole as one relation. They are 
distinct as the persons in the relationship. Thus, one might assume Henry would treat 
both relation and personhood with similar ontological status. We will see that he does.  
A through accounting of his framework should provide insight into the following 
questions: Are universals and relations real, or mental/verbal constructs? Does the term 
‘person’ signify something real, or something in the mind alone? And, how do each of 
these terms refer to created and uncreated beings? We will revisit these questions after 




AN EXEGESIS OF SUMMA, ARTICLE 53, QUESTION 1 
Article 53 of Henry’s Summa contains the secular master’s teachings ‘On Those 
Things That Pertain to the Distinction of the Persons’. Henry opens this section with a 
reflection on the articles before it and offers his reader an explanation of why he 
organizes the following discussion in the manner which he does. 
“Since thus far we have dealt with those things that in God pertain to the 
common substance, there remains that we thereafter deal with those 
attributes that pertain to the distinction of the persons. And we must do this 
first with those that pertain to those that are proper and secondly with those 
that pertain to those that are appropriated. And with regard to those that 
are proper we must first deal with those that pertain to the individual 
persons by themselves and secondly with those that belong to them in 
relation to one another. And with regard to those that belong to the 
individual persons by themselves, we must first deal with them in general, 
but secondly in particular. And in general, we must first deal with the 
persons, secondly with the properties of the persons that are commonly 
called notions.”85 
                                                           
85   “Praetractato hucusque de his quae in Deo pertinent ad communem substantium, deinceps restat 
tractandum de illis quae pertinent ad personarum distinctionem. Et hoc primo de eis quae pertinent ad 
propria; secondo de eis quae pertinent ad appropriata. Et circa propria, primo de eis quae conveniunt 
singulis personis secundum se; secondo de eis quae conveniunt ipsis ad invicem comparatis. Et de illis quae 
conveniunt singulis secundum se, primo in generali, secondo vero in speciali. Et in generali, primo de ipsis 
personis, secondo de proprietatibus personarum quae communiter notiones dicuntur.” Summa, LIII, P1, 3-
11. [60r, 1.] 
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With regard to divine persons, Henry maintains, two overarching questions need 
to be asked. First, he insists that one must formulate an answer concerning the manner 
of being (of the persons) in God. And only after that should one progress to a solution 
concerning the manner of the one person’s emanating from another.   
To the first, he addresses ten questions concerning personhood/ the divine 
persons. Henry first asks (1) whether it is necessary to hold that there is a person in God. 
He goes on to inquire (2) whether, in God, ‘person’ has being in a proper or transferred 
sense, (3) whether ‘person’ has being in God and in creatures univocally and with the 
same character, (4) whether ‘person’ has being according to substance or to relation, 
and (5) whether in God, ‘person’ signifies a thing or an intention. He then asks (6) 
whether an absolute supposite has being in God and (7) whether ‘person’ signifies 
something common in God. After inquiring about (8) whether or not many persons must 
be held to be in God, Henry asks (9) whether there are only two persons in God or some 
other number. And, finally, he responds to the question of (10) whether, in God, one 
person is in another mutually or in the same way.   
One can understand, given the traditional problems of individuation he has 
inherited, why he frames the discussion in these terms, and specifically in this order. To 
distinguish between persons in the divine, he draws his focus to the metaphysical 
nature of the divine persons. My interest begins with his first question, for it is here that 
Henry lays out his own unique account of personhood, in terms of eight specific 
components, and it is this categorization, when taken in context with the larger 
 
67 
treatment contained in this article, that exhibits Henry’s original epistemic 
considerations.  
Question 1 of article 53 contains Henry’s response to ‘Whether it is necessary to 
hold that there is a person in God’. (Utrum Sit Ponere Personam Esse In Deo.) In 
standard scholastic format, he begins with possible objections to, or reasons for 
rejecting, the notion of divine persons. He references Boethius’ definition, and the 
problematic implications of focusing on a ‘rational nature’ and ‘individual substance.’86  
Henry maintains that the divine has an intellectual nature rather than a rational one. 
Furthermore, one cannot describe God as an individual substance, since that implies a 
universal capable of being individuated, which is not the case with God. (See discussion 
above.)  
His second objection derives from the writings of Augustine in book five of On 
The Trinity. There, the nature of divine persons is explained as something said for mere 
convenience of thought. That is, person was employed as a way to talk about the divine 
rather than remaining silent. But critics suggested that had little to do with the divine 
nature itself, and merely demonstrated some fact about human limitations.87  This, of 
course, will not suffice since Henry wants to maintain the divine persons as necessary 
due to the divine nature, not just convenience of conversation. So, he offers Richard of 
                                                           
86 In Deo autem non est natura rationalis, sed potius intellectualis, neque substantia individual, quia non 
est individuum nisi ubi est universal individuabile, quod non est in Deo, ut habitum est supra. (Q1, p.1, lines 
6-9)  
 
87 Sed si persona esset in Deo, dictum esset tres personae, ut non taceretur, sed ut existens in Deo 




St. Victor as a contrary, and more appropriate, viewpoint because it accounts for the 
incommunicable nature of the divine and allows for a unity of substance despite that 
plurality of personhood.88  Henry compares the incommunicable nature of the divine 
persons to the property of generation between the Father and Son. Later he will argue 
that the property of the Father, by which he communicates his essence to the son, is 
also incommunicable.89   
In the process of introducing these objections, Henry has presented three 
possible meanings for the term ‘person.’  
Definition 1 (From Boethius): A person is an individual substance of a rational nature. 
 ‘persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia.’90   
Definition 2 (From Augustine): A person is that which is said so as not to remain silent. 
 ‘Dictum est tres personae, non ut illud diceretur sed ne omnino taceretur.’91  
Definition 3 (From Richard of St. Victor): A person is an existence found to have 
something one and incommunicable. 
 ‘Existentia divina si vel unum aliquid invenitur habere incommunicabile, ex eo 
solo depraehenditur atque convincitur esse persona.’92   
                                                           
88 …quia aut nihil est communicabile in Deo, aut si aliquid communicatur in eo, proprietas communicantis 
in quantum communicat non potest communicari ei cui communicatur… (Q1, par.3, lines 17-20) 
 
89 See below, q.10, par.37. 
90 Boethius, Against Eutyches and Nestorius 3; ed. C. Moreschini, p. 214; PL64: 1342C-D. (LIII,Q1,P1,5-6.) 
91 Augustine, On the Trinity 5, 9; ed. W. Mountain-F. Glorie; CC 59, 217; PL: 42: 918. (LIII, Q1, P2,10-11.) 
92 Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity 5, 1; ed. J. Ribaillier, p. 195; PL: 196: 949A. (LIII, Q1, P3,15-16.)  
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Solutio (The Resolution of the Question) 
Henry resolves that one must hold ‘absolutely and without qualification’ that 
there is a person in God, after determining that one must attribute to God only that 
which is ‘without qualification more worthy and better to be than not to be’. This point 
is attributed to On the Faith by Ambrose, and Henry maintains that it applies to the 
divine personal and essential qualities alike.93  
De Significatione Octo Terminorum (On the Meaning of the Eight Terms) 
It is at this point that Henry provides his own account ‘On the Meaning of the 
Eight Terms’. The terms are “individual,” “this something,” “singular,” “natural thing,” 
“subsistence,” “substance,” “supposite,” and “person.” These names, as he calls them, 
constitute his theory of personhood. According to Henry they ‘represent and signify 
almost the same thing with regard to the nature and essence of a natural thing, when 
nature is taken in a very broad sense.’94  An example of this arises when describing a 
human person. His task, then, is to determine whether they behave similarly when 
applied to the divine persons. Do all eight terms, when applied to the divine nature, 
represent and signify the same thing? Let us remember Henry’s inquiry into the notion 
of relation, where he invokes Aristotle’s determination that metaphysical statements 
must apply to all beings. A similar point is in play here. Henry cites a claim made by 
Boethius in On the Two Natures, that “If one wants to say ‘nature’ of all natural things, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
93 …quae provenit ex perfectione eius qui habet in se id quod alteri non potest communicari secundum 
quod dicitur persona, secundum quod infra videbitur. (Q1, par.4, lines 34-36.) (*See below, q.5, par. 26, 
33, and 34.) 
94 See Par.5.  
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such a definition will be given that can include all the things that exist…that, since they 
exist, can somehow be grasped by the intellect.”95  As we will see, Henry argues that the 
eight terms do not, in fact, apply equally to the divine persons as they do with other 
natural things. He considers them now, one by one, in this framework.  
Individuum 
 The definition of a nature must define substances and those accidents applied to 
them. While the first two terms (“individual” and “this something”) are found in the 
essence of a creature in both substance and accidents, they are not applicable to the 
uncreated essence or God. Again, Henry discussed the problem with individuation. Since 
“individual” has its contrary “non-individual” it becomes problematic when attributed to 
God, because these terms imply a universal. An individual (in character or intention), as 
he understands it, is only something really particular or singular if individuated under 
something really universal.96  But God is not an individual under a universal. 
Because, in God, ‘it is not possible in accord with what has been determined to 
find the character of a real universal or particular,’ it would not be possible to find the 
character of an individual except by extending the name ‘individual’ to the character of 
                                                           
95 Boethius, Liber contra Eutychen et Nestorium, cap.1 (ed. C. Moreschini, p.209, 63-65: Nam si de omnibus 
rebus naturam dici placet, talis definition dabitur quae res omnes quae sunt possit includere. Erit ergo 
huiusmodi: “natura est earum rerum quae, cum sint, quoquo modo intellectu capi possunt””, PL 64, 
1341B).  
 
96 “Individuum enim ex opposito distinguitur contra dividuum. Non est autem dividuum nisi re universale, 
neque ratio sive intentio dividui nisi circa universale secundum rem. Quare neque individuum est nisi re 




the singular.’97  This is why, Henry claims, the Decretals refer to the Holy Trinity as 
“individual according to the common essence, but separate in accord with the personal 
properties.”98  Henry extends the use of ‘separate’ to imply ‘distinct.’99  While 
separation is not found in the divine, distinction is. For this reason, Henry distinguishes 
between essence and natural thing/individual. ‘So that,’ he suggests, ‘a natural thing is 
properly said to be an individual, but a nature is said to be the essence of a thing 
whether in itself or as individuated in a supposite.’100         
Because Henry’s notion of individuation is so closely related to his notion of 
personhood, I treat it in further detail as a preface to section 8 on the term ‘person.’ For 
the sake of practicality, however, let us understand ‘individual’ as generally referring to 
an individual entity or instance as distinguished from a group of other entities/instances. 
Hoc Aliquid 
At first glance, the terms ‘individual’ and ‘this something’ may appear to have 
the same linguistic function and meaning. In other words, they seem to name/point to 
the same entities in the world and in our minds. Henry demonstrates, however, that this 
is not the case. He draws a distinction between the two, stating that while both terms 
do point to the same thing in reality (the utterance of ‘individual’ and ‘this something’ 
both designate the same object in the world), they differ from one another in meaning 
                                                           
97SLIII, Q.1, par. 6.   
98 Gregory IX, Decretals 1, 1, 1; ed. Ae. Friedberg, 2, p.5. 
99 “Discretio enim non est proprie in divinis personis, sed disinctio.” (LIII, Q1, p6,66-67.) 
 
100 See term sections 7 & 8 for continued discussion of ‘individuum.’ (p.62 of this dissertation.) 
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and signify differently or point to different concepts/notions in the mind- in relation to 
the object in the world.  
 Each term has in common the idea of some part, understood as standing under 
some whole which is divided by negation. They differ in how they accomplish this. The 
term ‘individual’ is said in order to signify the character of an entity which is unable to 
be divided further into parts while remaining a coherent whole. It expresses negation by 
denying divisibility. The words ‘this something’ is said in order to express the same 
signification. But, where ‘individual’ merely expresses that denial, or negation, of 
divisibility, ‘this something’ conveys that meaning (the denial, or negation, of divisibility) 
and more. As Henry states it, “this something…adds the character of negation in relation 
to a part divided with it. For when ‘this’ is said, a thing is understood to be something 
individual…But when ‘something’ is added, there is expressed that it is made something 
other from which it is divided.”101  
 The meaning that is expressed by the use, or utterance, of ‘individual’ is 
accomplished also by the use, or utterance, of the term ‘this’ alone. (In other words, 
‘this something’ is understood as an ‘individual something.’) But the addition of the 
word ‘something’ changes and adds to the meaning of the expression. So, the important 
difference between the two names ‘individual’ and ‘this something’ hinges upon the 
second term of the latter name. Namely, ‘something.’ Or, put differently, the word ‘this’ 
                                                           
101 “Hoc aliquid vero exprimit negationem eandem in comparatione ad ipsum divisum, et addit cum hoc 
rationem negationis in comparatione ad partem condivisam. Cum enim dicitur ‘hoc’ intelligitur res sive 
natura esse quid indivisum sive individuum in se propter demonstratione rei quae oculis conspici potest. 
Cum vero additur ly aliquid, exprimitur quod fit a condiviso aliud quid et in natura et essentia individua et 
in supposito.” (SLIII, Q1, par.7, lines 81-87.) 
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(referring to the character of this-ness) acts as ‘individual’ does to refer to the character 
of individuality. When ‘this’ is said, a thing or nature is understood to be something 
undivided or individual in itself because of the designation of a thing that can be seen by 
the eyes. (i.e., the entity in reality). The word ‘something’ does not. ‘Something’ then 
adds to this-ness/individuality an added nuance between nature, essence, and 
supposite. When ‘something’ is added, the expression means to make the entity 
designated by the ‘this’ something other than merely an individual. The otherness also 
expresses a distinct essence and nature. At this point, Henry has laid out the difference 
between the first and second terms. He then goes on to discuss how, like individual, the 
term ‘this something’ cannot properly apply to the persons of the trinity. 
 The reason Henry is distinguishing between these two names in the first place, 
we should remember, is driven by his larger discussion of the divine persons in the 
Christian God. These are two names which are commonly used to speak about that 
personhood, so, they must be carefully examined if one seeks to speak wisely on the 
subject. Henry acknowledges that a problem arises when one wishes to speak about the 
persons of God, if one wishes to say that the monotheistic, albeit triune, God contains 
different ‘individual, this something’s’ given the above distinctions. In the case of God, 
or the divine persons, the term ‘individual’ and its parallel name, in meaning, ‘this’ can 




It cannot apply because something, unlike indivisibility or this-ness alone, implies 
the character of ‘otherness’ in supposite. And, as Henry maintains, there is nothing 
‘other’ in God, insofar as ‘other’ expresses a difference in nature or essence. God, as the 
divine persons, may be triune (in other words, his meaning may encompass this-ness, or 
the character of three individuated entities in reality) but must have only one nature 
and essence. Christ is not another essence apart from the Holy Spirit in a real sense. 
Since the difference of meaning between divine and human persons cannot lie in 
otherness, or something, by virtue of different natures/essences, the difference must be 
accounted for, he argues, through otherness of supposites.  
Since the neuter form of ‘other’ names by itself (i.e. without the attached ‘this’) 
an essential difference, when used absolutely (as when one says ‘this something’ to 
express the meaning discussed above), it would be incorrect to admit that of God. (If it 
is meant absolutely- namely, that in God, one of the divine supposites is something 
other than the other.) But, it is said (functions/designates meaning) correctly if it is 
meant to determine that one supposite is different from the other. 
If we want to speak properly of God and creatures using the same terms, we 
must distinguish the sense, or meaning, of ‘other’ in its different applications. For 
example, the difference in the sense of the masculine form of the term as opposed to 
the neuter case. In this case, of course, as it relates to our use of the names ‘individual’ 
and ‘this something’ to refer to God the Father, the son, and/or the Holy Spirit. We can 
say that, in creatures, an individual supposite is a ‘this something.’ It is an individual or 
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something (entity) individuated in itself, but also something other than another 
supposite which has something in a common essence but in an individual essence 
something also different. And this causes no problem because the entities referred to 
(distinguished by the terms as separate) in reality are also different ‘something’s’ with 
different natures and essences.102  
 But when we apply these terms to God, as the divine persons (as opposed to 
human persons), we must distinguish differently, so as not to imply a difference of 
natures and essences between the entities to which the names refer. We must, in other 
words, use different names. In God, as opposed to creatures which can be called ‘this 
something’s,’ a supposite is properly said to be, rather, ‘this someone.’ The use, or 
function, of the name ‘this someone’ is meant to convey two things. First, by ‘this’ which 
is an expression of a singular existence in a supposite (individuality). And secondly, by 
‘someone’ which refers to some one as opposed to another and distinct from him, but 
not of another nature/essence. ‘Someone’ expresses one general instance of a nature 
from a group of instances of that nature.  
Singulare 
Besides speaking of the divine persons as ‘individual’ in character, or as ‘this 
someone,’ we are also inclined to use the word ‘singular’ in our descriptions of such 
                                                           
102 “Unde si proprie velimus loqui in divinis sicut in creaturis, debemus in hoc nomine ‘alius’ distinguere 
rationem generis masculini et neutri, ut sicut in creaturis proprie dicimus individuum suppositum esse ‘hoc 
aliquid,’ ‘hoc’ id est in se individuum sive individuatum, sed ab alio supposito aliud quid, hoc est in 
essential communi quid, sed in essential individuali aliud quid ab essential condivisi, sic in Deo proprie 
dicitur suppositum hic aliquis, ‘hic’ id est in supposito singulare existens, sed ab alio supposito alius quis et 
distinctus ad eo.” SLIII, Q1, p7, 96-103. 
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instances. So, Henry takes up the meaning of this term next. He does so, placing the 
term ‘singular’ as a segue between the first two terms and the next five to follow, 
because, he says, the next six terms are all found in a created reality and an uncreated 
one, but singularity differs from the terms which shall follow by virtue of being found in 
common accidents. According to Henry, that which is singular is found in common in 
accidents as well as in substances. (While, as mentioned, he will demonstrate that the 
next five names are found only in terms of the latter.)  
The character of something singular is, by definition, that of being one solitary 
something.103  And, because the term ‘singular’ includes the meaning of ‘solitary,’ the 
term singular can be understood in two distinct ways, namely, absolutely or with a 
determination.  When the term ‘singular’ is understood in the first way (absolutely) it 
cannot be admitted of God’s character, based upon the teachings of Peter Lombard, and 
the established tradition of the period. Henry cites book I of the Sentences, where the 
Master says that ‘singularity or solitariness shows that a plurality of persons is 
excluded.’104   
If understood this way, Henry maintains, it would be false to assert of human 
beings that one human being, like Socrates, is singular. It would be false because it 
would exclude, by virtue of the term’s distinguishing character, or function, the 
                                                           
103“Sed illud quod est singulare invenitur communitur in accidentibus et substantiis; alia vero quinque in 
substantiis tantum. Singularis autem ratio est quod sit unum aliquid solitarium. Sed intelligendum quod 
singulare includendo solitarium potest intelligi absolute vel cum determinatione.” (SLIII,Q1,p8,105-109.) 
  
104 Peter Lombard, Sentences 1, 23, 5; ed. I. Brady, 1, p.186. (Roland Teske ‘restored pluritatem which is 




fellowship of all others who share in human nature along with Socrates. But, since the 
term can be understood alternatively (with a determination), as will be shown below, 
Henry holds that it may apply to human beings in one way and in divine persons (God) 
another. 
‘For in God,’ Henry writes, ‘there cannot be solitariness in either act or in 
potency.’105  In other words, the divine persons, though triune and distinct, do not 
contain multiple acts and potency in the way described by Lombard. This differs from 
human persons, since in the case of Socrates and his fellow human beings, there can be 
solitariness in act. Humanity, as such, could exist in only a single supposite. So, Henry is 
led to conclude that we may speak of the solitariness of human beings (i.e. use the term 
‘singular’ to refer) in an absolute manner, only if we mean by that the singular whole of 
humanity, not the particular instance of ‘Socrates.’ We cannot speak absolutely at all of 
the divine persons in terms of absolute singularity though. 
However, ruling out an absolute function for the term does not exclude it from 
use all together. For Henry returns now to the second way in which we may understand 
‘singularity.’ Rather than absolutely, the term can also be taken ‘with a determination.’ 
In this way, then, it (the character of ‘singular’) can be admitted in both (human beings 
as well as God/the divine persons) with regard to the essence and with regard to the 
supposite. If used properly, in other words, we may speak accurately of God and human 
                                                           




beings using the same name to refer to the presence of a certain type of singularity 
without violating the univocal nature of the former.  
Henry needs to be able to speak this way of the divine persons because they do, 
in a sense, contain a certain singularity and a singular essence, or else we would not be 
able to refer to the triune nature as a whole or speak meaningfully about the Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit separately.106  Although the deity is, Henry wants to maintain, 
singular in nature, that singularity must also encompass (in some manner) the addition 
of other, singular persons.  
The Father of the trinity, for example, is a certain singular person. But, while 
singular, the character does not exclude the fellowship of many persons (like a Son) as it 
would have in the previous case of absolute meaning. This is coherent, yet avoids the 
violations of an absolute use, similarly to our being able to say of Peter that ‘Peter is a 
singular person,’ without the intention of excluding him from the larger fellowship of 
human beings, but rather, in order to distinguish him by excluding the plurality (or 
plurification) of that in which the singularity is said to exist, whether that be in the 
essence or the supposite. In this way, or, taken with this determination, the meaning of 
the term ‘singular’ can refer to both the created and uncreated.  
However, though it may refer similarly in the case above, the character of being 
‘singular’ belongs to the essence and supposite of creatures differently than it does to 
the essence and supposite in God. For, unlike the created, in the uncreated (in God) 
                                                           
106 A reference to Gregory. 
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singularity belongs to the essence itself, not by virtue of having being in a person, but by 
virtue of being divine.107  (Henry as has already drawn out above his reasons for holding 
that the deity must be understood as a singular essence of itself.108 ) So, when we speak 
of ‘God the Father’ as a singular instance, or of ‘God the Son’ our mention of the name 
is not meant to imply exclusion/multiplicity of essences, but rather the persons of God, 
as Peter is a person of humanity. (In this restricted sense, and nothing more.) 
The term ‘singular’ differs, then, when applied to humanity as opposed to the 
divine, insofar as it is not a ‘this’ of itself, but only by virtue of belonging to ‘this’ person. 
(Also established above.) So, the difference in use/meaning lies in the way in which the 
term is understood to relate to essence and supposite. Singularity, as Henry will 
continue to discuss, has being in a different way in God and in creatures. So, while it 
may apply, in a specialized sense, it does not suffice to convey the proper meaning of 
divine personhood. 
Res Naturae 
Henry’s discussion of singularity, i.e. the term ‘singular,’ is followed by a brief 
treatment of ‘natural things.’ As Henry suggests, ‘natural things’ are different from that 
which is said to be ‘singular.’ Natural things differ from singularity, insofar as the 
meaning of ‘singular’ belongs to both an essence and a supposite. The term ‘natural 
                                                           
107 “Deitas enim est singularitas quaedam sive quaedam singularis essential ex se, ut habitum est supra. 
Non sic autem humanitas, quia ex se non est hoc, sed solummodo quia est huius, ut similiter supra 
habitum est. Aliter similiter habet esse in supposito singularitas in Deo et in cretauris, ut declarabitur 
infra.” (SLIII,Q1,p8,129-133.) 
 
108 (Q1, 8. N20): See SQO 52, 2; ed. M. Fuhrer, pp. 250-253. 
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thing,’ however, does not apply to an essence, but only a supposite. As a result, the 
character of a supposite is not found in accidents (arbitrary attributes attached to 
substances), but only in substances themselves. The essence, in contrast, is itself a 
nature- regardless of whether it is that of a substance or an accident. So, Henry 
maintains, only the supposite of a substance can properly be said to be a natural 
thing.109  Henry bases this claim upon his ideas on the nature of essence, specifically, 
that whether it be accidental or substantial, essence has ratification of its existence only 
in the supposite of a substance. For, as Henry mentions elsewhere in his discussion of 
‘individual,’ “a natural thing is properly said to be an individual, but a nature is said to be 
the essence of a thing whether in itself or as individuated in a supposite.”110  
The notion of substance is then used as a segue into Henry’s treatment of the next 
term- ‘subsistence.’  
Subsistentia 
Henry’s discussion of the meaning of ‘natural things’ concludes with a brief 
reference to substance. He notes there that essence (whether of substance or accident) 
only becomes ratified in the supposite of a substance. Substance, then, applies to 
individuals. Henry uses this characteristic to distinguish the meaning of ‘subsistence’ 
from the other terms in question.  
                                                           
109 “Solum vero suppositum substantiae est res naturae, quia esstentia sive substantialis sive accidentalis 
ratitudinem suae existentiae non habet nisi in supposito substantiae.” (SLIII,Q1,p9,139-141.)  
 
110 SLIII, Q1, par. 6. 
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In the tenth paragraph of this question, Henry takes up the meaning of 
‘subsistence.’ Having already related substance strictly to individuals, it is at this point 
where he considers ‘subsistence’ in relation to universals. Noting the etymological roots 
of the term, he appeals to its common usage, as it functioned for both the Greeks and 
Latins. According to this standard meaning, he maintains, ‘subsistence’ belongs in 
common to both individuals and universals. Subsistence applies to something which is 
universal, in that it belongs to a genus and a species, while also being used to apply 
to/belongs to individuals. Subsistence means ‘to subsist.’ Unlike the substance of an 
individual, subsistence implies the act of holding oneself up. As Henry says, ‘it is meant 
to stand in holding oneself up.’ Subsistence, therefore, belongs to everything that is in 
the category of substance. (Insofar as it is substance.111)  We might think of this in terms 
of the circles of a Venn Diagram- where each circle represents a term and includes all 
those things which that term applies too. In the case of substance and subsistence, the 
circle representing ‘substance’ would be contained in a larger circle of those things 
which are said to subsist.  
At this point, then, Henry has established the meaning of (individual*), ‘this 
something,’ ‘singular,’ ‘natural thing,’ and ‘subsistence.’ The nature of substance, or the 
meaning of the term used to refer to substance, has been mentioned in the previous 
discussions- used as a point of distinction for gaining clarity on the terms ‘natural thing’ 
                                                           
111 “Dicitur enim subsistere sive subsistencia quasi se ipsum ‘tenendo sistere’, et convenit omni ei quod est 




and ‘subsistence’ specifically. So, building upon what he has already said about the 
term, Henry moves next to an examination of ‘substance.’  
Substare 
‘Subsistence,’ for the ancient Greeks and Latins, meant ‘to stand in holding 
oneself up.’ This characteristic is said to belong to those things of an individual nature as 
well as to universals. ‘Substance,’ however, implies the connotation ‘to stand under.’ 
According to Henry, substance is said to mean that which is under something else 
(whether under accidents or universals) that strictly belongs to an individual 
substance.112  He cites Aristotle and Boethius as exemplary support for his claim about 
this meaning. In the Categories, Henry notes, first substance is “most of all and 
principally said to be that which is neither in another nor said of another.”113  But other 
things are in substance or said of it too. Therefore, as he also cites, Boethius continued 
to make the further claim, in On the Two Natures, “Substances subsist only in particular 
individuals. For the understanding of universals is taken from particulars. Hence, since 
essences exist in universals, they receive substance in particulars.”114  It stands under, 
Henry suggests, in that it offers a subject to accidents in which/so that they can be. (i.e., 
become actualized in a substance.) Again, Henry is carefully treating the meaning of the 
eight terms by distinguishing them from one another. He has given a restricted 
definition of substance as it relates to subsistence, considering each term in the context 
                                                           
112 (SLIII,Q1,p11,148-150.)  
 
113 Aristotle, Categories 5.2a11-13; Boethius, trans. ed L. Minio-Paluello, p.7.  
 
114 Boethius, Against Eutyches and Nestorius 3; ed. C. Moreschini, p.216; PL 64: 1344B. 
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of individuals and universals. This is a clear point at which we see the discussion of his 
theory of universals arise out of his questions about the divine persons!  
Henry understands this as a progression of Boethius’ own consideration for the 
etymological roots of the term. For Boethius writes, in the same text mentioned above, 
that genus and species only subsist because accidents do not properly belong to them. 
Individuals, however, are not only admitted by Boethius to subsist, but also to stand 
under in the manner that is proper to substance alone. In that text, Henry notes that 
Boethius also gave consideration for the common usage of the term by the ancient 
Greeks. According to him, “they call hypostases individual substances, because they 
stand under other things and are subject to other things, such as accidents.”115  So, 
Boethius’ acknowledgment confirms, ‘substances’ are used by the Latins much the same 
way ‘hypostases’ is used by the Greeks.    
To summarize at this point for clarity, all substances subsist, but not all subsisting 
things are substances. Substances subsist, furthermore, only in particular individuals, 
and therefore, not in universals alone because those are taken from particulars. The 
term ‘substance,’ then, implies a different meaning than the Latin ‘subsistence’ which is 
closer in function to that of the Greek ‘hypostases.’ ‘Supposite’ however, as Henry takes 
up next, does convey the same meaning as ‘subsistence.’ In fact, Henry claims that they 
are ‘entirely the same.’116    
                                                           
115 Boethius, Against Eutyches and Nestorius 3; ed. C. Moreschini, p.216; PL 64: 1344B. 
116 “Suppositum vero apud nos penitus idem est quod subsistentia, et convenit tam universali quam 
singulari in praedicamento substantiae.” (SLIII,Q1,p12,163-165.) 
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I include here, somewhat out of order with the primary text, Henry’s final 
comment on the meaning of this term. After treating the meaning of ‘supposite,’ but 
before addressing the term ‘person,’ Henry makes a comment about a change to the 
meaning of ‘substance.’ He says that, despite the common usage of the ancients, there 
was (by the time he is writing) a different function for the name as it was being used 
among the Latins and Greeks. He, along with his contemporaries, does not use the term 
in the same way, in part, because of a distinction pointed out by Augustine in On the 
Trinity. Augustine states there that, unlike the Greeks, the Latin use of ‘substance’ 
developed to assume an implication about essence. And, ‘essence’ is not usually 
understood in another way other than substance.  This final inclusion of ‘essence’ will 
provide his segue into his treatment of the term ‘person.’ But, first, let us return to the 
meaning of ‘supposite.’  
Suppositum 
If the term ‘supposite’ means entirely the same thing as the term ‘subsistence,’ 
as Henry maintains at the beginning of this section, one might wonder why it merits its 
own treatment as a term at all. Or, at least, why it merits more than the mere statement 
of equivalence alone. ‘Supposite’ does mean the same thing for Henry as ‘subsistence’ 
in terms of, or in relation to, substance. (The term just discussed above.) These two 
terms imply similar meaning insofar as they both belong to what is singular, as well as 
that which is universal, in the category of substance. This is, specifically, due to the 




shared function of standing for either ‘what is signified or what is named.’117   A 
‘supposite’ however, is different, because in something singular, the same thing is 
signified and named, but this is not the case in respect to universals.   
Henry then offers a final reflection on the meaning of ‘substance’ (which I have 
included out of order, but on topic, in the section devoted to that term118 ) before 
addressing the notion of ‘person.’ So, at this point let us revisit his remarks on 
‘individuum.’ 
‘Individual’ is the first of the eight terms to be examined by Henry in this 
question. But, I have chosen to hold it and analyze it here, so that it will be placed in 
direct relation to his treatment of ‘person,’ which is the last of the eight terms to be 
discussed. I place them in this context, primarily, for the sake of clarity against my larger 
thesis- one which I situate in relation to Gracia’s work on The Problem of Individuation in 
the Middle Ages.119    
Henry takes up the meaning of ‘individual’ in response to a statement made by 
Boethius in On the Two Natures. In the passage of note, Boethius asserts that “If one 
wants to say ‘nature’ of all natural things, such a definition will be given that can include 
                                                           
117 SLIII, Q1, par.11.  
118 See Part V. 
119 Thanks to the Philosophy Department at The University of South Carolina, through their outstanding 
work on the lecture series, I had the privilege of meeting Dr. Martin Pickave to discuss his view of Henry’s 
treatment of the term ‘individuum.’ Pickave’s work about individuation in Henry has been tremendously 
helpful while navigating what Henry has to say about the issue in Article fifty-three. The Professors 
insights into the correlation between Gracia’s project and Henry’s statements in his Summa greatly 
benefited this study at a critical stage in its development. For anyone interested in understanding 
individuation in Henry’s ontology further, I highly recommend his contribution to the Brill Companion to 
Henry of Ghent: Henry of Ghent on Individuation, Essence, And Being. (M. Pickave, Henry of Ghent On 
Individuation, Essence, And Being 2010) 
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all the things that exist. Such a nature belongs to those things that, since they exist, can 
be grasped by the intellect.”120  According to Henry, then, each of the eight terms 
represent and signify almost the same thing with regard to the nature and essence of a 
natural thing, when nature is taken in its broadest sense. Boethius’ definition, Henry 
acknowledges, defines substances and accidents. But, it should be understood that the 
term ‘individual’ (as well as ‘this something’) is found only in the essence of a creature, 
i.e. a created thing, both in substances and accidents alike, but not in any way in the 
uncreated, or, the divine/God. Henry insists upon this distinction because, for example, 
the term ‘individual’ gets meaning from a distinction. ‘Individual,’ he maintains, is 
distinguished over/against (derives meaning from) ‘non-individual’ as its contrary. 
Something non-individual can only exist where there is something really universal. Nor, 
he argues, is the term used with intention of referring to the non-individual except 
when pointing to a universal. For an individual, by virtue of the meaning of the term, is 
only applied to something particular- in other words, for singulars individuated under a 
universal. (See discussion of substance as ‘to stand under’ in Part V.) And, in the 
alternative manner, the character of ‘individual’ is only intended in cases of particular 
instances with regard to reality.121  This distinction is significant considering his overall 
project of applying these terms to a notion of ‘person’ which must include the divine 
persons of a triune nature.  
                                                           
120 Boethius, Against Eutyches and Nestorius 1; ed. C. Moreschini, p.209; PL 64: 1341B. 
121 SLIII, Q1, par. 5. 
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The application of ‘individual,’ as Henry presents it, is related to the character of 
universals and particulars. But, in God, Henry notices, it is not possible to find the 
character of a real universal or particular.122  So, it will similarly not be possible to find 
the character of an individual, except by extending the name ‘individual’ to the 
character of a singular. In other words, in order to properly apply the term ‘individual’ to 
the divine persons, the meaning of the term needs to be extended beyond the one 
addressed at the start. Henry points to an example of this distinction employed in the 
Decretals, where it is written ‘This holy Trinity individual according to the common 
essence…And separate in accord with the personal properties.’123  He uses this is an 
example of extension- in this case, ‘separation’ has been extended to mean ‘distinction.’ 
Now the term may be properly applied, because separation does not belong to God, but 
distinction must.  
Persona 
The last of the eight terms to be considered by Henry in question 1, article 53 of 
his Quaestiones Ordinariae (Summa) is ‘person.’ At this point, he has presented an 
account for the meaning of seven other terms- individual, this something, singular, 
natural thing, subsistence, substance, and supposite- inquiring as to whether they can 
be properly applied to/synonymous with each other. He has undertaken this 
examination, remember, to address the question of whether it is necessary to hold that 
                                                           
122 See SQO 43, 2; ed. L. Hodl, pp.52-53.  
 
123Gregory IX, Decretals 1, 1, 1; ed. Ae. Friedberg, 2, p.5.   
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there is a person in God. So, the ultimate project is to relate each of these terms to the 
final word, ‘person.’  
According to his articulation of the meaning of the aforementioned terms, 
“‘substance,’ ‘supposite,’ ‘subsistence,’ and such like,” are said with an improper 
meaning if applied to God, “insofar as it depends on character of the name,” because 
what subsists (stands/holding up) in God does not stand under anything else- neither 
universal nor accidental. The confusion stems, Henry asserts, from the original usage of 
the term as belonging to creatures, and therefore implying creaturely impositions. But, 
in God, when the meaning is extended (or distinguished) as he suggests here, ‘person’ 
subsists by itself in the essence.124   
Following his consideration of ‘supposite’ and ‘substance,’ Henry returns his 
attention to etymological differences found between ancient Greek and Latin uses of 
these terms, this time with respect to ‘person.’ The Greeks, he writes, use the word 
‘person’ to signify the same thing (in reality) as ‘hypostases’ or ‘substance’ could. The 
Latin usage of the term, however, developed a point of contrast regarding the generality 
of that usage and over the proper meaning it should be understood and purported to 
convey. When it comes to the generality of usage, Henry reasons that the Latins use the 
name ‘hypostases’ or ‘substance’ without any difference (both in intellectual and non-
intellectual beings), whereas the Greeks use ‘substance’ only in rational beings.125  And, 
                                                           
124 SLIII, Q1, par. 14.  
 




he argues, a similar difference occurs in the meaning of ‘prosopon.’ Or, ‘persona.’ He 
credits Boethius for drawing the distinction: ‘When they say prosopa, we can also call 
the same substances persons.’126  Henry notes that the Latin usage applies only to 
intellectual or rational beings. “For,” he writes, “although it signifies the same intention 
in creatures as this name ‘individual,’ it does so with regard to a determinate matter, 
namely, rational.”127  (Again, supported by Boethius.)  
At this point, Henry provides an example by way of analogy- relating the terms 
‘snub’ and ‘curved’ in terms of a nose. Henry points out, of course, that ‘snub’ and 
‘curved’ signify the same thing (namely, a particular characteristic of the nose), but the 
latter does so indifferently with respect to any matter, whereas the former, ‘snub,’ 
signifies, or refers to, the same thing, just in specific respect to nose like things.128  For 
example, a road may be ‘curved,’ as well as a sculpture, or signature, or dimensional 
plane. But ‘snub’ is used to indicate that feature in noses alone. In the same way then, 
he encourages, one can think about the meanings/usage of ‘individual’ and ‘person.’ 
‘Individual’ signifies something indeterminate in relation to a rational and non-rational 
nature (like ‘curved’ signifies beyond the context of a nose), yet ‘person’ signifies 
something determinate- something proper to a rational nature. (‘Person’ then is 
analogous in our example to ‘snub.’)  So, he reasons, the name ‘person’ “implies a 
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character of dignity”129  that the former does not. Henry means by this that, because the 
term ‘person’ is reserved for a more restricted/specific case of objects it can refer, it 
implies/imposes a higher, more sophisticated, level of meaning. In the same way ‘snub’ 
captures something specific to nose-type things that ‘curved’ cannot (due to its 
generality of use), so too the term ‘person’ captures something about things of a 
rational nature which the term ‘individual’ cannot.  
Understood in the manner put forth, Henry maintains, the term ‘person’ can 
be/is admitted in God without any improper meaning of the name. In other words, the 
word can be used and applied to signify the divine without violating the essence of that 
which it is intended to refer. He pauses here, before moving on to the reply portion of 
the question, to bring Richard of St. Victor back to the forefront of the discussion. In On 
the Trinity Richard points out that ‘some call persons subsistence’s and others call them 
substances,’ but ‘…they can less properly’ be said to be so. While in the Latin usage ‘no 
name can be found that can be better suited to the divine plurality than the name 
‘person.’130  Henry is using Richard’s statements here as an illustration of the value he 
has placed upon the term ‘person’ over ‘individual’ above, given the restricted nature of 
its signification.  
To the first argument (that ‘rational’ and ‘individual’ are, according to Boethius, 
placed in the definition of person) Henry responds that ‘Person,’ when understood after 
his treatment of the names, ‘subsists by itself in the essence’.  Boethius’ ‘rational’ can be 
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expanded to include ‘the purely intellectual’ and ‘individual’ in terms of 
‘incommunicable.’ What subsists in God, he argues, cannot be said to stand underneath 
something, whether that be a universal or set of accidents.131  For, “where Boethius says 
that ‘a person is an individual substance of a rational nature’, Richard says that ‘a person 
is an incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature. But how this definition must 
be understood and explained, will be seen below.”    
To the second argument, that there is said to be three persons in the divine in 
order that one may have something to say of it, Henry responds that one should take 
Augustine to be right “on account of the novelty of the use of the same name with 
regard to God.” Henry suggests that Augustine was simply attempting to show that 
Christians could meaningfully speak of the triune nature of the Trinity, when asked 
about the matter by probing heretics. That which is expressed by the name ‘person’ was 
in truth from eternity in God according to its true meaning, or could be conceived with 
regard to him, and that the usage of the term was forced to take on false meanings 
when misunderstood or taken out of context. (Though Henry does acknowledge here 
that Augustine did not provide a sufficient account for the heretics through his 
statement, but only a comfort to the believers.) He references Richard again as having 
seen this problem and addressed it in book 4, chp. 5 of his work On the Trinity. Richard 
argues in that text for the important role of the Holy Spirit in proper conceptualization 
                                                           




of the names. As such, he concludes, this is the meaning one should be after when 
inquiring into the nature of the divine persons.  
Yes, this is a metaphysical account of personhood, insofar as it is an attempt to 
define the reality, or real nature, of the subject in question. But, Henry addresses this 
inquiry by way of asking how the term applies- whether it is a term of first or second 
intention, whether the word applies to the actual individual or the universal concept, 
what distinctions and relations should be considered…these are epistemic questions, 
which demonstrate an awareness of and sensitivity to linguistic, as well as logical, 
implications. Prior to this study, a discussion of the persons in the Trinity may not have 
seemed an obvious, or even helpful, place to look for Henry’s theory of universals. Yet, 
here it is. This is the epistemological turn. Henry is unique in being sensitive to the fact 
that metaphysical discussions of substance, person, etc. have epistemological 
consequences or epistemological assumptions. Henry was perhaps the first secular 
theologian to demonstrate this awareness, or, at least, make it explicit in his 
metaphysical analyses.132   
And, this is the crux of my thesis. Henry acknowledges that the term ‘persona’ 
may be problematic as it had been used and understood by his predecessors and 
contemporaries. So, he considers the other possible options. As we know, the persons 
of the trinity are incredibly important for Christian theologians and medieval 
philosophers to get right. So, if there was a more accurate way of thinking and speaking 
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about the subject, one ought to consider it seriously. Henry does just that. For if one of 
the other eight terms could convey the same meaning and prove useful in forming the 
same concept of ‘person’ yet without the historical pitfalls of that term, such a 
correction should be made. Hence, the exercise of article 53, question 1. But in 
examining the eight terms, Henry arrives at the conclusion that this cannot be achieved. 
The term person conveys something unique which no other available terms can achieve 
when applied to the divine nature. In fact, the epistemological consequence of using a 
term other than ‘persona’ is worse than any seemingly negative consequences that 
come along with it because something essentially important is lost.  
Here, we must consider Henry’s notion of ‘incommunicability.’ For it is the 
reason Henry thinks it necessary to hold the notion of the divine persons. As he 
demonstrates, the term ‘person’ implies an uncommon-ness which the other terms 
available fail to capture. A person, specifically, lacks any commonness with any other 
entity. This is why it is so important for our understanding of the divine nature. Here is 
his correction of Richard of St. Victor’s treatment of the term. Henry claims that Richard 
missed this important point, and furthermore, that his analysis is incomplete because of 
it. This uncommonness cannot be articulated by any other term than person, and so, it 
is necessary that the triune nature of the divine be labeled, rightly, as persons rather 
than individuals, supposites, and so on. Let us now lay out his comparison of the eight 




AN ANALYSIS OF SUMMA, ARTICLE 53, QUESTION 1 
The Medieval style of writing can often seem scattered and obtuse to the 
modern reader. And Henry’s teachings are known to be a challenge. John Duns Scotus 
admitted to his own difficulty in navigating through Henry’s thought, in part because it 
was ever evolving, but also because Henry seldom states his own stance directly. One 
must often absorb the whole and sit back to reflect upon the details before the general 
meaning will present itself. In the case of question 1 and Henry’s treatment of the eight 
terms, it is helpful to lay out the consequences of his discussion in an organized, applied 
manner so that we can see the results of his arguments in the same way his students 
might have in a discussion after his lecture. Taking the above exegesis into account, let 
us consider the first seven terms separately as they each compare to the term ‘person.’ 
Because as Henry himself admits at the start of his discussion “these names represent 
and signify almost the same thing with regard to the nature and essence of a natural 
thing, when nature is taken in a very broad sense.”133  So let us arrange them in regard 
to ‘person’ specifically. 
Remember the original problems which Henry posed as the motivation for this 
question: the implications of Boethius’ use of the terms ‘rational nature’ and ‘individual
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 substance,’ and Augustine’s remark that one only uses the term ‘person’ so as 
not to remain silent. Also, recall Henry’s insistence upon attributing to God only that 
which is most noble and worthy of perfection.  
Based upon Henry’s definition of a person: p4: “Person names something that is 
without qualification of dignity. For, from what it signifies, it names the character of 
something incommunicable…and this comes from the perfection of him who has in 
himself what cannot be communicated to another.” (“It also names that with regard to 
a rational or intellectual nature…”)  
The Eight Terms, Compared 
I. Are all instances of ‘this something’ a person? NO 
Are all ‘persons’ referred to by ‘this something’? NO  
This something, according to Henry, has a two-fold meaning. ‘This’ captures the 
equivalent meaning of ‘individual’ and the addition of ‘something’ connects onto that 
the sense of otherness (i.e. an other nature or essence in a supposite). So, there are 
instances of things that exist as ‘this something’ which are not persons. And there are 
instances of persons which do not exist as ‘somethings.’ But rather, ‘someone.’ 
The relevance of distinction comes into play here, because Henry points out the 
difference between the meaning of ‘other’ through the masculine and neuter genders, 
where the neuter is absolute, and the masculine allows for the distinction to allow for 
some ‘one’ instead of some ‘thing.’ 
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II. Are all ‘singular’ entities persons? NO 
Are all ‘persons’ singular? NO  
The character of something singular, according to Henry, is that of one solitary 
something. So, there are singular entities which would not be considered persons and 
there are divine persons which would not be considered singular since they are neither 
‘something’ nor solitary. Now, again, a distinction can be made, Henry acknowledges, 
between the absolute singularity of human persons and the restricted singularity of 
God’s essence which does not include God’s personhood. For example, Socrates and 
Plato are both singular humans. If Socrates dies, humanity remains in Plato as a singular 
human. God is a singular nature, but God is not three separate persons such that God 
would still be God without the person of the Father.  
III. Is every ‘natural thing’ a person? NO 
Are all ‘persons’ natural things? NO 
A natural thing, according to Henry, is properly said to be an individual (*p6) and 
belongs only to a supposite/substance. So, there are many non-person beings and 
objects that count as natural things. But the incommunicable element of personhood 
does not require a supposite/substance/individual in the case of God. Thus, persons 
which are not natural things.  
IV. Is every ‘subsistence’ a person? NO 
Is every ‘person’ a subsistence? NO  
 
97 
Subsistence, according to Henry, belongs in common to something universal, 
that is to a genus and to a species, and to individuals. “To subsist” is said as if it meant to 
stand in holding oneself up, and it belongs to everything that is in the category of 
substance.134 Thus, there are entities which subsist as something other than persons. 
And the persons of God do not subsist, insofar as they are not universals/individuals. 
(See ‘supposite’ which Henry takes to be a synonymous term.) 
Later, when Henry is discussing the meaning of person, he makes a distinction with 
respect to subsistence. Stating that it is improperly applied to God if meant to ‘stand 
under,’ he notes that one could say, appropriately, that a person subsists by itself in the 
essence. But this still requires the unique notion of personhood and therefore is not as 
noble a signification as ‘person’ alone. 
V. Are all ‘substances’ persons? NO 
Do all ‘persons’ have substance? NO  
Substance, according to Henry, means ‘to stand under.’ That is, to stand under 
something else, be it accident or universal, and therefore properly implies individual 
substance. Thus, there are many substances that are not persons. And there are 
persons, such as God the father, who are not particularized by some other universal as a 
substance. Henry notes a difference between the use of ‘substance’ among the Greeks 
as opposed to the Latin use by his students and colleagues. The Greeks use substance 
only in the case of rational beings, whereas the Latin use is more general. Yet, as he 
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explains, the Latin use of person is more specific, implying the addition of rational and 
essence. Thus, a distinction is needed between prosopon and persona.   
VI. Is every ‘supposite’ a person? NO 
Is every ‘person’ a supposite? NO  
Supposite, according to Henry, is “entirely the same” as ‘subsistence.’135  It belongs 
to what is universal, as well as what is singular, in the category of substance. Since they 
stand for what is signified or named, there are non-person supposites. But there are 
also divine persons which are not properly said to be supposites, insofar as they are not 
attached to substance as individual or universal. (See ‘subsistence.’) 
VII. Are all ‘individuals’ persons? NO 
Are all ‘persons’ individual? NO  
An individual, according to Henry, is something in-dividuated under a universal. So, 
there are many non-person particulars which are individual. And uncreated, divine 
persons which are neither nor attached to universals, and so are not individual. The 
issue of distinction becomes clear at this point, when Henry caveats that the term 
‘individual’ can apply to the divine persons in a restricted sense as singular/separate if 
extended to distinction.   
VIII. Persons 
All persons, are, therefore: beings of an intellectual nature and an incommunicable 
essential quality.  
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All persons, are not, therefore: instances of ‘this something’, absolute ‘singularity,’ 
‘natural things,’ ‘subsistence,’ ‘substance,’, ‘supposite,’ or ‘individual.’   
Some persons- namely created, human persons- also happen to be instances of 
singularity, subsistence, individuality, and so on. But the logical claim ‘All’ does not apply 
because of the uniqueness of the divine persons as having none of those other qualities 
absolutely.   
Henry has essentially constructed verbal Venn diagrams which demonstrate the 
existence of elements unique to the category of ‘person.’ They necessitate the use of 
the term, and in some ways define it, whereby ‘person’ captures that subset of meaning 
which falls outside the realms of the other seven terms. Once captured through 
comparison, one can mentally organize the idea of an incommunicable essence in its 
own right and make proper use of the other terms to draw distinctions.  
Of note here is a reflection upon Henry’s original explanation for the 
organization of this article as a whole. “We must deal with those attributes that pertain 
to the distinction of the persons first by considering those that pertain to those that are 
proper (only to be followed by those that are appropriated). And with regard to those 
that are proper, we must first deal with those that pertain to the individual persons by 
themselves (secondly with those that belong in relation to each other). And with regard 
to the individual persons, we must first deal with them in general. And in general as 
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persons, secondly with the properties of the persons called notions.”136 He has stayed 
true to his original proposal. 
The Eight Terms, Applied  
To help us understand Henry’s sense of these eight terms in application, and the 
ontology he constructs with them, let us apply them to beings of a varied nature. For 
illustration, I have chosen examples from the categories of uncreated being, human 
animal, non-human animal, and inanimate object. (Specifically, God the father, Jonah 
the man, a whale, and a sea pebble.) According to Henry, the eight terms would be 
applied to these beings, properly, if understood in the following manner: 
The Sea Pebble 
1. This Something? Yes. 
A sea pebble is an individual object, apart from the sand and sea, with its own 
existence apart from other sea pebbles. 
2. Singular? Yes. 
A sea pebble is one, solitary existing thing. It is a singular example, or a particular 
instance, of a universal.  
3. Natural Thing? Yes. 
Since natural things belong to supposites, which belong to substances, and sea 
pebbles are instances of substance, a sea pebble exists as a natural thing. 
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4. Subsistence? Yes. 
Subsistence belongs to everything that is in the category of substance. Thus, sea 
pebbles, insofar as they are instances of substance, subsist.  
5. Substance? Yes. 
Substance, as defined by Henry from the Categories, is “most of all and principally 
said to be that which is neither in another nor said of another, but other things are in it 
and said of it…It stands under because it offers a subject to accidents so that they can 
be.”137 So a sea pebble, as an individual particular instance of a pebble, is a substance. 
Thus, we can attribute accidents to it, like it is a ‘grey pebble’ or a ‘round pebble.’  
6. Supposite? Yes. 
Entirely the same, according to Henry, as subsistence, the sea pebble exists as a 
singular in the category of substance. 
7. Individual? Yes. 
A sea pebble is a substance with accidents which subsists as a particular instance of 
a universal notion of ‘pebble’ and is distinguished against non-individual as its contrary. 
Thus, is an individual according to Henry’s definition of the term. 
8. Person? No.  
Henry’s working definition of a person requires a being of an intellectual/rational 
nature. So even setting aside the matter of incommunicability, a sea pebble does not fit 
the bill.  
                                                           




1. This Something? Yes.  
We can stand before the whale and point to it as an individual, existing being- 
separate from our ourselves and from other whales and from the sea pebble. Thus, 
signifying it as an other.  
2. Singular? Yes. 
The whale is not all whales. It is a solitary instance of the multitude of whales which 
swim in the sea.  
3. Natural Thing? Yes. 
A whale is made up of substance, situated as an existing occurrence in nature.  
4. Subsistence? Yes.  
Again, insofar as a whale is an individual substance and natural thing, it subsists.   
5. Substance? Yes. 
A whale is an object we can attribute accidents to, susceptible to generation and 
decay. 
6. Supposite? Yes. 
A whale is an instance of a supposite, insofar as it is a singular individual.  
7. Individual? Yes.  
The whale is an undivided sort of whole, which subsists as an example of the 
universal concept of whale- apart from or alongside other particular whales.  
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8. Person? No.  
I chose a whale (as opposed to a dolphin or household pet), in part because of its 
role in a well-known story about uncreated and created beings, but also to stay away 
from the human/non-human debate. As far as Henry was concerned, along with most of 
his students and colleagues, whales were in no way intellectual beings with an 
incommunicable essence. If we were to apply his definition through the modern lens of 
possible non-human persons, this conclusion may change to include such a category. 
But that would be our own modification to the ontology, by way of Henry’s original 
teaching.   
Jonah, the man 
1. This Something? Yes. 
As an instance of an individual ‘this’ + the addition of otherness, one could point to 
Jonah as ‘this something.’ (Using the neuter form of the term.) Yet in addition, and 
unlike the sea pebble and the whale, Jonah has the quality of personhood. As such, he is 
more properly referred to by the male-gendered descriptor this ‘someone.’ 
2. Singular? Yes. 
Jonah is a solitary being, subsisting as a singular supposite, if we mean to imply that 
he, as a single man, is an instance of the universal ‘humanity.’ 
3. Natural Thing? Yes. 
Jonah is a rational animal, and therefore, a substance. So too is he a natural thing.   
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4. Subsistence? Yes. 
Insofar as Jonah is a substance with accidents, he also has the quality of subsistence.  
5. Substance? Yes. 
Jonah, the animal, is a physical object susceptible to generation and decay. Insofar 
as he is considered in that manner, he is considered a substance. If we mean by ‘Jonah’ 
the incommunicable nature of personhood, that must be distinguished as a separate 
notion.   
6. Supposite? Yes. 
Jonah is a supposite because he is a singular, individual being as an essence with 
accidental qualities.   
7. Individual? Yes.  
Jonah is an individual man as a particular instance of the universal humanity. He is 
not David, Peter, or Paul. But he stands with them under the same universal ‘man.’ He 
has otherness through his accidental qualities, substance, and so on.    
8. Person? Yes.  
Jonah is considered a person because, unlike the sea pebble and the whale, he is a 
rational animal of an intellectual nature with the quality of an incommunicable essence. 
In other words, Jonah has something within himself that cannot be communicated to 
another. It is worth taking note of this point in Henry. Here we find his philosophy of 
personhood as somehow related to our notion of self-consciousness- insofar as we 
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mean by that a ‘privileged access’ like what Henry might intend through his use of 
‘incommunicability.’  
God, the Father 
1. This Something? No.  
According to Henry’s understanding of ‘individual’ as a particular falling under a 
universal, and his view of ‘this’ as synonymous with ‘individual,’ God’s being is not 
relevant to the term ‘this.’ And since he takes the term ‘something’ to imply the 
addition of substance, and otherness, this does not properly apply to God either. Like in 
the case of Jonah the human person, God is more appropriately referred to as 
‘someone.’ Unlike Jonah, however, alternate distinctions are required so as not to 
confuse the otherness of ‘someone’ with a separateness of the divine persons as one 
God. 
2. Singular? No. 
God the Father is not singular, if ‘singular’ is meant absolutely, because plurality of 
persons would be excluded by singularity of supposite. A distinction must be made, 
however, with regards to a determination towards essence. God is singular of essence, 
while at the same time containing the singularity of fatherness.  
3. Natural Thing? No. 
Natural things, according to Henry, belong to substance, of which God the Father is 
not. Note that I specified God the Father, as opposed to the divine persons. Jesus, at the 
point of being a human man, was perhaps a natural thing. But that is a complicated 
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rabbit hole to go down and does not affect our project here, so I suggest it be avoided 
for the time being. 
4. Subsistence? No. 
Subsistence, Henry argues, is said with an “improper meaning in God insofar as it 
depends on character of the name, because what subsists in God does not stand under 
something, neither under a higher universal nor under accidents, as is the case in 
creatures…but person rather subsists by itself in the essence.”138 So, God does not 
subsist absolutely. But we might say properly that God the Father does have subsistence 
in a restricted sense. Namely, ‘as a person’ not ‘as a substance.’  
5. Substance? No. 
God the Father does not ‘stand under’ as a supposite for accidents, generation, and 
decay. His perfection excludes his nature from having this quality. Again, as with natural 
thing, the case does get complicated if considering the human manifestation of Christ, 
the son. 
6. Supposite? No. 
God the Father is not a supposite, in the absolute sense, for the same reason he is 
not a singular or an individual. These terms imply the existence of accidents, 
particularity under universals, and all other fore mentioned imperfections. 
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7. Individual? No.  
God, including the person of the Father, is not the sort of being to which ‘in-
dividuum,’ as contrary to non-individual and related to a universal, can properly refer. 
8. Person? Yes. 
God the Father, as such, is by necessity a ‘person’ for the same reasons Jonah is 
considered as such, plus the added degree of perfection brought about by its use rather 
than any of the other terms. It is necessary to think and speak about him in this manner, 
because it is the only term available to us which captures the meaning of 
incommunicability we are after.  
Let us notice what Henry has established, after viewing his discussion alongside 
this analysis: the uniqueness of the term ‘person,’ because of the implications and 
nuance it contains, and the specialization of its use and meaning which is necessary for 
the proper concept formation and signification of God. In so doing, he has resolved the 
problems posed at the outset, as well as established his own working definition of 
personhood for use in his teachings to follow. He has addressed his first problem- 
demonstrating the distinctions which explain the language originally chosen by Boethius 
and the corrections made by Richard of St. Victor. He has rephrased the second problem 
of Augustine’s remark from ‘in order that one might be silent’ to “on account of the 
novelty of the use of the name.”139 Thus, Henry reasons, Augustine was not actually 
answering the heretics who posed the question, but those believers who might 
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understand, and thus “be freed from their attack without the confusion they would 
have incurred through silence.”  
We begin to see, here in his concluding remarks, the real thrust of his discussion. 
Yes, he is addressing the specific difficulties posed to the treatment of person set forth 
by Boethius and Augustine. Yes, he is expanding upon the need and efficiency of the 
correction made by Richard of St. Victor. But indirectly, through his examination of the 
eight terms, he has drawn attention to the development of the term person as a 
linguistic/mental tool. He concludes the question with a telling quote from Richard: 
“Those who first transferred this name ‘person’ to God did so out of necessity,” but 
under the knowing and purposeful guidance of the Holy Spirit who knew the specialized 
meaning it could cultivate. And thus, Richard continues, “we are seeking not the 
understanding with which human beings first imposed” the term, “nor the necessity out 
of which it was transferred to God, but the truth with which it was inspired…in those 
who transferred it and has been used universally” ever since. In other words, Henry 
believes that the proper use of the proper term (the proper connection between word 
and thing) can result in the proper mental concept. (Thus, we have unexpectedly found 
a statement on Henry’s philosophy of language and human knowledge by way of his 
views on the relationship between words, thoughts, and things!) This is what I mean by 
my thesis of an epistemic turn. According to Henry, using the term ‘person’ to refer to 
God allows us to think and talk about God’s perfection, and makes possible the 
distinctions necessary by which to do so.  
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At the close of Chapter 3, On Relation, I proposed that a thorough accounting of 
Henry’s framework of the issues should be able to answer the following questions about 
the status of universals, individuals, relations, and persons: Are they real? (Do they exist 
in the world in individual objects?) Or, are they mental concepts? (Do they exist in the 
mind alone as verbal/cognitive tools?) And how do they each apply to created and 
uncreated beings? Our investigation into the first question of the fifty-third article of 
Henry’s Summa has produced insight into his solutions.  
According to this text, we can say the following about Henry’s treatment of the 
terms: All four terms (universal, individual, relation, and person) pick out something real 
in the world outside the mind. Individual (and therefore also universal), relation, and 
person can all properly be said to apply to created beings, so long as they fulfill the 
adequate criteria. However, individual and universal do not apply to the uncreated 
being of God, since God’s unity does not allow for the matter/form dichotomy necessary 
for the individual/universal hierarchy. Only relation and person apply properly to God, 





Many of Henry’s ideas have attracted the attention of contemporary scholars. 
For example, B. Tierney has recently written about Henry’s notion of human rights, an 
idea that influenced his own distinctions between absolute and ordained powers but 
may have also influenced William of Ockham in his inquiries into the power of civilian 
rule. In 1993, R. Teske published English translations of certain questions, in which 
Henry treats the human will, that have received a great deal of interest and mention. R. 
Pasnau recently (2002) published translations of two questions from Henry’s Summa for 
The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts.  
That there is a renewed interest in Henry’s thought is evidenced by the two 
international conferences which took place in 1996 and 2003 and were devoted entirely 
to Henry’s theories. (The proceedings of which have each subsequently been published.) 
In his two-volume work on science and knowledge of God in the thirteenth century 
(2000), S. Marrone devotes a quarter of his attention solely to the thought of Henry of 
Ghent. In 2003, Blackwell’s A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages was 
published, which included a lengthy article by R. Wielockx about the overall views of the
 Solemn Doctor. Since that time, Gordon Wilson edited the Brill Companion to 
Henry of Ghent, which is already garnering a great deal of interest and reference.  
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Others have taken note of Henry’s defense of academic freedom for the masters 
at Paris when the Bishop of Paris attempted to influence and restrict certain topics of 
discussion at the University, the fact that Henry maintained (contrary to the prominent 
opinions of his day) that women do have something substantial to contribute to their 
offspring, and his quite original consideration of whether, even in a just war, a civilian 
has an absolute obligation to fight.  
It is not difficult to imagine how the idea of ‘person’ relates to each of these 
issues as well as the project of understanding his larger philosophy, and is therefore, 
worthy of more careful and comprehensive scholarly attention alongside the rest of his 
work. Examining that idea in his thought must include an evaluation of his Summa, 
article 53, question 1. Alongside the significance this project holds for Henry scholarship 
specifically, there is a broader application to be acknowledged. 
Contemporary philosophy is filled with debates about personhood. Namely, the 
status of being a person. The consequences of the controversy are pervasive and 
significant to a broad range of our current intellectual endeavors. In ethics, for example, 
we see concerns over the rights of a fetus or non-human animals. In modern theology, 
there is current importance being given to the notion of the ‘Acting Person.’140 Professor 
Christopher Tollefsen has put forth a number of impressive works on the subject of first 
person knowledge and persons in relation to Bioethics.141 There are political/legal issues 
                                                           
140 See “The Acting Person” by Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II). Analecta Husserliana, 1979. 
141 See Reference list for his co-authored book entitled Embryo: A Defense of Human Life, which includes a 
chapter on Personhood, as well as two papers "Is a Purely First Person Account of Human Action 
Defensible?" and "Persons in Time".  
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regarding corporate personhood, ontological discussions of machines and artificial 
intelligence, epistemic problems of agency and performance, and so on. In Western 
philosophy, there are a number of definitions given for the meaning of the word 
“person” with no established consensus in sight. So, there is value in studying the 
historical development of the problem, if nothing else, in order that we might 
understand and take into account the different philosophical traditions now converging 
upon the topic. Of those traditions, perhaps, none is more influential to what we’ve 
inherited than that of the medieval Christian thinkers.  
A forthcoming article on the subject, by Anthony F. Shaker, begins with the 
following observation: “The word person conjures up the idea of an irreducibly unique 
individual. As natural as this association may appear to us, it hides developments that 
have been underway for two and half millennia. …The medieval period brought the 
concept of personhood more clearly than ever within the purview of philosophical 
inquiry.”142 This is true because Christianity is arguably the first philosophical system to 
use the word “person” in its modern sense.143 And the medieval period was largely a 
dialogue and working out between Christian, Jewish, and Islamic thinkers. Drawing on 
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its Greco-Roman roots, the word “persona” was used by early Church fathers who 
transferred the meaning from its original theatrical use to a more technical, theological 
characterization of a triune God. Tertullian’s work, Adversus Praxean (‘Against Praxeas’) 
stands as one of the first examples of this. It was later refined by Boethius and 
continued to be developed throughout the Middle Ages. So let us reflect upon the 
development in Article 53 of Henry’s Summa.  
Boethius defined person as “a rational being of an individual nature.” And while 
Henry incorporates much of the Boethian tradition into his own views, he nevertheless 
makes a change for his own definition by substituting the notion of ‘incommunicability’ 
for ‘individual.’ This is representative of exactly the sort of philosophical development 
that Jorge Gracia attributes to the thirteenth century. Namely, a move from purely 
metaphysical concerns over the principle of individuation towards a more nuanced 
approach, sensitive to corresponding issues like the epistemological matter of 
indexicals, the realist/nominalist debate, and the movement towards Aristotelian logical 
concerns.  
Comprised of ten questions concerning ‘Those Things That Pertain to the 
Distinction of the Persons’, the first question asks ‘Whether it is necessary to hold that 
there is a person in God.’ Is it necessary, Henry investigates, to think and speak of the 
divine in terms of personhood, or is there a better option available to us? His approach 
to this question consists of an examination of the 8 terms which he takes to be the most 
relevant and applicable possibilities available for dealing with the notion of said 
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distinctions in our concept of the divine. Other than the term “persona,” which he 
admits has a seemingly problematic history, he considers the terms ‘hoc aliquid’ (this 
something), ‘singulare’ (singular), ‘res naturae’ (natural thing), ‘subsistare’ (subsistence), 
‘substancia’ (substance), ‘suppositum’ (supposite), and ‘individuum’ (individual)- asking 
of each ‘does this term do a better job at referencing the divine, and our concept of the 
divine, than the term person does?’144   
One by one, Henry demonstrates a weakness of each term in sufficing to capture 
the proper triune aspect of God’s nature. Except one. ‘Persona,’ he concludes, is the 
only term available which has a unique enough meaning to succeed in the task. It serves 
as a unique placeholder, linguistically and conceptually, for conveying the 
incommunicable aspect of the essential nature of certain created and uncreated 
beings.145 
Hence, our analysis to accompany the exegesis. We have considered the text as 
it was originally intended- a classroom lecture for advanced students which would serve 
as a jumping off point for a larger, more sophisticated analysis of ideas. I suggest we 
think of this article as a textbook that Henry wrote for his students to use during the 
course of his teaching. Understood in this way, we can allow ourselves to imagine the 
sort of discussion and exercise that would have arisen from the material. Using the text 
                                                           
144 His first question basically sets up an exercise in an examination of terms- considering what modern 
philosophers might speak of as the ‘connotations’ of each. This is a different exercise than a purely 
metaphysical one- where the nature of being is the driving force for considering implications.   
145 This is a difficult, but sophisticated, stance to take- as it implies some level of privatization on the part 
of the person and an isolation from the ability to fully communicate its own essence. It sounds a bit like 
what more modern philosophers might refer to as ‘privileged access.’ 
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of the question as a foundation, the analysis considers the implications of what such a 
list of terms entails. I argue that Henry must have used this question as a way to 
encourage an exercise of comparison and contrast between the eight terms considered, 
and furthermore, that that exercise necessarily leads to a certain conclusion about the 
uniqueness of personhood. Without walking through those steps, ourselves, we might 
miss the procedural element of his argument, or worse, the ultimate force of his 
conclusion.  
I have reconstructed what I take to be his scholastic project, based solely upon 
the text itself. I’ve done so in the following manner: by 1.) considering each term by 
itself and in relation to “persona,” and 2.) by considering each term as it applies to 
different types of beings. So, for example, I lay out a comparison of supposite and 
person according to, and restricted to, what Henry claims about each term in this 
particular question. Based upon what he says, we can ask ‘Are all supposites persons?’ 
and ‘Are all persons supposites?’ The same exercise is carried out between individual 
and person, and so on, for each term included in his list. This is followed by a 
consideration of how the terms would apply, again based solely on Henry’s presentation 
of each, to the divine being, a human being, and a non-rational animal. For example, is 
God a supposite and an individual and a person? And so on…  
These two procedures, or exercises, serve to bolster the claims of my thesis. 
They flesh out in greater detail what may not be immediately obvious from the words of 
the text, but yet are nevertheless apparent when a closer look is taken. Namely, Henry’s 
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conclusions about the uniqueness and necessity of personhood, as a linguistic tool and 
conceptual framework, for dealing with the problem of the divine nature.  
The Trinitarian concerns posed by this question, alongside the philosophical 
problems they imply, led Henry to develop a treatment of distinctions as conceptual 
tools, necessary for making the proper connections between words, thoughts, and 
things. The need to draw mental distinctions between persons and substances, the 
possibility of holding persons and individuals as separate ideas, the acknowledgment of 
a difference between our notions of persons and natural things…These conceptual 
challenges require the same distinguishing capability from the language they 
accompany. In short, considering the distinction of the divine persons pushes Henry to 
consider the act of distinction itself. 
In summary, we have established Henry’s position in context with the traditions 
he inherited- demonstrating the ways in which it is an original contribution, how it is 
distinct from the positions held by his contemporaries, and why it represents the 
epistemic shift that scholars like Jorge J.E. Gracia attribute to the University system of 
the 13th and 14th centuries.  
I situated Henry’s discussion of divine personhood alongside his teachings on 
relation which highlighted the difference between his treatment of a purely 




And I have provided a thorough exegesis and analysis of the text at hand, 
working through his examination of the terms …  as the systematic exercise it was 
intended. In so doing, I’ve shown how the epistemic implications of the subject become 
an integral part of Henry’s framework.  
Thus, we see that Question 1, Article 53 of his Summa represents an unexpected 
epistemic sensitivity in the teachings of Henry of Ghent.  
Our concept of a person, and the way we use that term to refer, has come under 
challenge by recent classifications of ‘non-human persons,’ legislative proposals that 
cooperation’s be categorized as ‘persons,’ the on-going debate over when a fetus 
becomes a ‘person,’ and so on… As a result, there exists in philosophy (as well as the 
general public) a great deal of reflection about the ways in which this term, and our 
understanding of it, are developing. T. Beauchamp posits, in his article on Problems in 
Theories of Metaphysical Personhood, that the dispute is “created by the vagueness and 
the inherently contestable nature of the ordinary language concept of person.”146 
Beauchamp’s writings focus mainly on the ways in which the concept of metaphysical 
personhood fails or succeed in comparison with contemporary concerns, such as the 
categorization of non-human persons. But his concerns, and those like his, may also be 
viewed through the lens of the medieval debate. In a similar abstract from The Failure of 
Theories of Personhood, Beauchamp states that the problem is inherent in the “common 
                                                           
146 Beauchamp, p.319. See also English (1975) for an early and influential analysis of this problem, as well 
as DeGrazia (1996, esp. pp.305-15).   
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sense concept of person as, roughly speaking, identical with the concept of human 
being.”147  
Our modern concerns about the definition of person, albeit situated in different 
context and applied to different subject matter, are relevant to the medieval project of 
personhood and discussions like Henry’s on the definition of person in the context of 
divine persons in the Christian Trinity. Henry, as we have seen, was careful to distinguish 
between the object in existence, or subject of reference, and the term used to talk, and 
think, about that subject. We gain further understanding, through an investigation of 
this text, how certain roots of our contemporary concept of a person can be traced back 
to the Medieval period. And, whether he was correct in his theories, we can learn from 
his approach to the philosophical problem- namely, the importance of carefully defining 
our terms and distinguishing the meanings of the names we use when engaging in 
epistemic and metaphysical disputes alike.  
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LOOKING FORWARD- DISTINCTION IN ARTICLE 53
The Middle Ages of Western Philosophy are marked by the intersection of 
Jewish, Christian, and Islamic thought. And theirs was largely a conversation about the 
nature of God. What does it mean to speak of one, true God? How can a triune God be 
unified? What is the nature of God’s personhood? These questions propelled the 
medieval debate forward, and like most rigorous philosophical pursuits, gave rise to the 
need for distinction. Used as a tool for refinement, the ability to draw distinctions offers 
the conceptual and linguistic power necessary for organizing an ever-expanding set of 
ideas. The schoolmen of the Medieval University not only employed the use of 
distinction but turned their gaze directly towards it examining the thing itself.  
Henry’s contribution to the matter garnered a great deal of interest from his 
contemporaries and sparked a great deal of debate amongst his predecessors. So, the 
title of article fifty-three alone, ‘On Those Things That Pertain to the Distinction of the 
Persons,’ ought to coax our curiosity. It is here that Henry moves from an examination 
of the term ‘person’ to a discussion of whether that term signifies a thing or an 
‘intention.’ Hence, this article demonstrates a link of development between Henry’s 
Trinitarian views and one of his most notorious ideas- what Roland Teske referred to as
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 ‘a hallmark of Henry’s metaphysics’- the intentional distinction.148 A thorough 
accounting of the first question in the article would be remiss not to include a 
preliminary acknowledgement of that link.  
Henry’s teachings on distinction categorize the act, or operation, into three types 
according to the sorts of things they are meant to distinguish: real distinctions, rational 
distinctions, and intentional distinctions. Definitions of each, along with examples and 
category criteria, are spread throughout Henry’s writings. While there are lingering 
questions about subcategories and possible inconsistencies within Henry’s own use of 
terminology, much effort has been put forth to present a coherent summation of his 
very complicated conceptual schema. The following is a rough sketch of what we can 
say about Henry’s understanding of each distinction type:  
I. Real Distinction (distinctio realis)  
Henry defines a real distinction as the sort of distinction between things (res), that 
is, between two substances or between a substance and its quality or quantity. (Either 
as absolute from both sides or relative from one side.) The criteria for a real distinction 
is met when really different things must imply diverse natures or essences, whether 
simple or composite, in terms of reality. Really similar things must imply the same thing, 
such that one does not add anything real to the other. By ‘thing’ Henry means here 
“whatever is some absolute nature and essence that has an exemplar idea in God, able 
to come into existence by the divine operation.”149 (P.236n45) Such a thing is a thing 
                                                           
148 Teske, 2006.  
149 Teske 2006, pp. 233 and 236n45.  
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derived from ratification or validation; it has being of essence (insofar as God is its 
exemplary cause), but does not have being of existence unless God causes it to exist in 
reality through efficient causality. For example, composites, like man and donkey, or 
principles of composites, like matter and form. A definition and the thing defined are 
examples of real sameness. Likewise, the divine attributes are really the same. A dog 
and a houseplant, however, are really distinct. 
Relations are not things. Hence, a relation is distinct from the substance that has 
being only intentionally, not really. By ‘real’ Henry means ‘having possible existence.’150 
(Which is different from the use of the term by Aquinas to imply ‘actual existence.’) 
Henry refers to a real distinction between essence and existence as compared with 
Aquinas and Giles of Rome. Matters are complicated by Henry’s views on metaphysics 
and physics- the former considering primary essences, the latter devoted to really 
existing things. “Separability and inseparability are tied to the various sorts of 
distinctions and provide quite different grounds for a real distinction at the 
metaphysical and the physical planes of consideration.” 151 
II. Rational Distinction (distinctio rationalis)  
Henry defines a rational distinction as the sort of distinction that is purely mental or 
in no way real. Things that are distinct merely rationally can be mutually predicated of 
each other. There must be inseparability in reality and in the mind for two things to be 
                                                           
150 Teske 2006, p.237 from Quodlibet 5.6.   
151 J. Paulus, pp.228-9. 
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considered rationally distinct.152 An example of this would be the divine attributes, 
which are really identical, are only rationally distinct. A definition and the thing defined 
are only rationally distinct. Henry also seems to categorize relation and divine essence 
as rational distinctions.153 (Here, reason is used in a technical sense, and does not 
include ‘a certain cognitive power of an intellectual substance from which our soul is 
called rational,’ nor does it mean ‘reason in accord with certitude about something 
doubtful.’ 
III. Intentional Distinction (distinctio intentionalis)  
Henry defines an intentional distinction as a distinction between two intentions in a 
single thing, one of which does not include the other. An intention (as Henry uses the 
term) is a note, or trait, of the essential content of a res, which does not differ from it in 
any real sense, nor from its other identifiable notes, yet can nevertheless be expressed 
by an independent concept.154) The intentions really exist in the res, but potentially, 
whereas the distinction is an operation of the intellect alone. Things that differ 
intentionally are really the same but differ insofar as the mind forms different concepts 
of them, yet concepts that cannot be predicated of each other, and therefore, are not 
purely rational distinctions. ‘Intentions and the intentional distinction thus track the 
                                                           
152 ibid., pp.229-230.  
153 Teske 2006, p. 240.  
154 “But here an intention is called something really pertaining to the simplicity of an essence, which can 
be separately conceived without something else, from which it does not differ by an absolute thing and 
which pertains to the same thing. Hence, an intention is said to be a tending within (intus tentio), because 
by its concept the mind tends to something that is in a thing and not to something else that is something 
pertaining to the same thing. And in that way the intellect, to which it pertains to divide those things that 
are the same in reality, forms diverse concepts of the same thing, as concerning elements diverse within 
the conception of the mind, but concerning ones the same in reality.” (N55p238) 
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internal ontological structure of an object.’155 Henry scholars now agree that the idea of 
an intentional distinction is tributary to Avicenna, the terminology having been taken 
directly from Avicenna’s Metaphysics. (chapter 5, book 1) (ftnt.82) 
Intentional difference applies to inseparability in the same thing but separability in 
different things.156 “A diversity of intentions can exist only between those that are 
united according to reality so that the concept of one completely excludes the concept 
of the other.”157 In this way, the intentional distinction looks identical to the rational, 
purely logical, type. The only difference is that in the intentional cases, one of the 
concepts excludes the other (can be thought of separately/independently from each 
other), whereas the concepts of a rational distinction are compatible. So, this means (as 
Henry was aware) that everything that differs in intention also differs in reason, but not 
vice versa. Examples include diverse differences in one species, like vegetative and 
sensitive elements, which cannot be separated from the individual animal, but can be 
separated from other animals and plants. ‘Animal’ and ‘rational’ are intentionally 
distinct in a single human being. So, the intentional distinction is not necessarily just an 
intermediate stage between the real and purely rational types.158  
                                                           
155 Brill, 2011. p.206, notes 77 and 78.  
156 Teske 2006, p.234, n37. 
157 Ibid., p.240, n67.  
158 The standard organization of medieval theories of distinction parallels Henry of Ghent and Thomas 
Aquinas as realist representations in opposition to the nominalistic notions of John Duns Scotus. While 
this is, by and large, a correct categorization, it ought not exclude the ways in which Henry’s ‘intentional’ 
distinction compares to the ‘formal’ distinction put forth by Scotus. (**support- Brill p.208-9 + ftnt 91) 
Ludwig Hodl,p206: “intention also means that formal element of meaning of the essence without which 




Given the above schema, the subject of article fifty-three raises the question 
‘What sort of distinction is the distinction of a person?’ Does Henry understand the case 
of the divine persons as representing a real, rational, or intentional distinction? Because 
his categorizations are based upon the things they distinguish, answering this question 
should also provide an account of Henry’s notion of personhood as it fits into his 
metaphysical ontology. Does he view it as a thing or a figment of the mind, or something 
else? Unpacking these questions requires us to extend our reach beyond the first 
question, and is therefore, beyond the scope of this project. But question one bears 
valuable fruit nonetheless. Besides containing an unexpected epistemic turn, it 
establishes a point of intersection between some of Henry’s most significant ideas- his 
notion of relation, his understanding of individuation, his view of personhood, and his 
teachings on the intentional distinction. It is interesting where this initial examination of 
the eight terms leads. In question five, Henry takes up the matter of whether ‘person’ 
signifies a thing or an intention and this early treatment of the uniqueness of 




POINTS OF INTEREST FOR FURTHER STUDY 
As the first formal exegesis and analysis to be undertaken of Henry’s Summa 
(Quaestiones Ordinariae), art. 53, question 1, the future of the project is multi-faceted. 
First and foremost, it contributes to a fuller and more accurate understanding of the 
teachings and writings of Henry of Ghent, namely his philosophical treatment of 
‘person.’ But there are several other interesting ideas emerging from the lines of this 
project. While they are beyond the scope of our purposes here, I would be remiss not to 
point them out.  
I include here a brief mention of the following points for further consideration:  
I. Medieval Notions of Form & Matter 
II. Abelard & Henry as Nominalists? 
III.  Ongoing Disputes About Relation 
IV. Henry as an Empirical Realist? 
V. Concept Formation 





I. Medieval Notions of Form and Matter 
One such theme is that of the relationship between body and soul, or more 
precisely for medieval thinkers, between matter and form. Much has been written 
about Descartes’ debt to Medieval philosophy, so I will not make that case here. But, it 
is important, in those discussions to acknowledge the Scholastic tradition with accuracy. 
Given the attention paid to Descartes’ response to Scotus and Ockham, and 
furthermore, their being influenced by Henry, it stands to reason that those inquiries 
should also take Henry’s teachings into serious account as a point of development in the 
philosophical treatment of form and matter. In attempting to reconcile Augustine and 
Aristotle (with others, mentioned here) Henry posits a theory of matter and form as a 
hylomorphic compound. While it has been well established what he has to say regarding 
the human being and divine persons elsewhere (taken from those texts available), his 
discussion of the divine persons in art.53 is certainly relevant to his overall thoughts on 
the issue of person and the unity of essence. And, therefore, should be included in these 
studies.  
Just as modern thinkers have inherited the dualistic account of Descartes, Henry 
and his medieval contemporaries inherited a dualistic form of Platonism, which defined 
the human being as a ‘rational soul using a mortal body,’ thereby distinguishing 
between the material and immaterial elements assumed in that understanding of the 
person. Yet, Henry also inherited Augustine and Aquinas’ rejections of that dualism- due 
to concerns over the interaction of separate/distinct substances. While these concerns 
will eventually lead to the philosophical materialists, Henry provides a unique 
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perspective of a transitional moment in the discussion, namely the metaphysics of 
hylomorphic compounds. In his oft-cited work, Body and Soul, Peter King pays special 
attention to what Henry has to say about this issue, stating that his is a particularly 
‘instructive case.’ As King notes, Henry’s development of a full theory of the plurality of 
substantial forms in human beings (of which I argue his discussions of divine persons 
relate) represents an effort, in the final years of the 13th century, ‘to clarify the 
Augustinian solution and make it precise in an Aristotelian framework…as part of the 
larger project of getting clear about the metaphysics of form/matter composites.’ We 
see this taking place in article 53, regarding the definition of person when applied to the 
divine.  
II. Abelard and Universals  
Abelard is considered one of the first examples of nominalism, or perhaps more 
accurately irrealism159, in the Western tradition. In defense of his theory of universals, 
Abelard argued that there cannot be any real object in the world which could satisfy 
Boethius’s criteria for the property, and therefore, universality is not an ontological 
feature of the world but a semantic feature of language. This lies at the heart of 
Abelard’s metaphysics, but clearly, also develops what we might now describe as his 
philosophy of language. The notion that ‘universals are nothing more than words’ raised 
the objection that common names, if not the names of common items, would be 
rendered meaningless. (This is where Abelard thought his teacher, Roscelin had gone 
astray by holding that universals were ‘mere mouth noises.’) Abelard is careful, to avoid 
                                                           
159 See P. King, 2015, section 2: Metaphysics.  
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the same mistake, to distinguish between the semantic property of a names reference 
(nominatio- what the term applies to) and that of its sense (significatio- what hearing 
the term suggests; or doctrino- the informational content of the concept which is meant 
to be conveyed). In this way, Abelard’s philosophy of language is then linked with his 
notion of concept formation/intellect, and therefore, a certain philosophy of mind. This 
is, interestingly, like the epistemological sensitivities we see Henry demonstrating in his 
discussion of the divine persons. When claiming what he does about universals as a 
linguistic phenomenon, Abelard gives a ‘contextual explication of intentionality that 
relies on a linguistic account of mental representation, adopting a principle of 
compositionality for understanding.’160 He concludes that mental images must have an 
instrumental role in the thought process, but only as intermediary signs of things 
(intersigna rerum). Intentionality derives, instead, from the act of attention directed 
towards the mental image. Again, a similar treatment of names and signification is seen 
in article 53.   
These theories kept Abelard in contention long after his death, including their 
mention (albeit not by direct reference) in the Condemnation of 1277- of which Henry 
was a part of composing! And, in his own lifetime, Abelard engaged in debates with the 
anti-dialecticians. Bernard of Clairvaux, and others, claimed that the meaning of a 
proposition of the faith, to the extent that it can be grasped, is plain and without the 
need of aid from reason. Abelard, despite the contention, continued his attempt to 
show how religious claims can be understood, and how the applications of dialectical 
                                                           
160 Ibid. section 5.  
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methods might help in that development. (This is similar to Richard of St. Victor, and 
what we see in article 53 of Henry’s Summa.)  
Besides the conflict over reason, there were also Trinitarian implications to 
Abelard’s nominalism which were viewed as problematic/heretical by the Church and 
certain University Masters. In matters of the Trinity, Abelard concluded that Boethius’ 
account of identity needed work if it was to accurately capture the true nature of the 
divine. Derived from Boethius, this traditional account holds that things may be either 
generically, specifically, or numerically the same or different. Abelard categorizes 
identity by four modes: essential sameness and difference, (closely tied to essential…) 
numerical sameness and difference, definitional sameness and difference, and 
sameness and difference in property. He held that two things are the same in essence 
when they are numerically the same concrete thing, and essentially different otherwise. 
Yet, noted, numerical difference does not match up precisely with essential difference. 
According to Abelard, since things may be neither the same nor different, numerically, 
the question ‘How many things are there?’ is ill-formed. When this is applied to the 
Trinity the result is: three persons who are essentially the same as one another, (same 
concrete thing- God) but differ in definition (what it is to be the Father is different from 
the Son). The persons are numerically different from one another though and each have 
at least one unique property from the others. This path through metaphysics, language, 
and mind- applied to the Trinity- is quite similar to what we find in Henry’s Summa, 
art.53. Though, to my knowledge, no one has pointed this out or examined the 
correlation in a formal capacity. Now that this study has been undertaken, such a 
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comparison is possible, and would be an interesting opportunity for a deeper analysis of 
both thinkers.  
III. Ongoing Disputes About Relation  
I believe Henry’s discussion in this text is pertinent to the recent work of Scott 
M. Williams. In his 2012 article, Henry of Ghent on Real Relations and the Trinity: The 
Case for Numerical Sameness Without Identity, Williams argues that “there is a hitherto 
unrecognized connection between Henry of Ghent’s general theory of real relations and 
his Trinitarian theology, namely the notion of numerical sameness without identity. 
Critiquing the debate between Mark Henninger and Jos Decorte concerning the nature 
of the divine persons of the Trinity, Williams makes the case that Henninger’s 
articulation of relation is to be preferred as more consistent with Henry’s own 
understanding of the term. While Williams’s paper focuses specifically on Henry’s notion 
of relation, the same arguments might be extended to his notion of personhood in a 
similar manner. Getting clear on Henry’s teachings about the divine person in this 
section of the Summa (which is not mentioned by Williams) would certainly help to 
clarify and add textual support to one side of this debate or the other. (I believe it adds 
credence to Henninger’s articulation of Henry’s notion of relation, while may complicate 
certain statements that Williams makes about Henry’s use of the term ‘person’ more 
generally.) I do not believe, taking this portion of text as an example, that we can say 
yet, with absolute certainty, what Henry’s definitive understanding of ‘person’ was, or if 
he even fully developed a consistent theory as such. I think studies like these (as well as 
Williams’) are necessary, though, for moving us in that direction.  
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IV. Henry As An Empirical Realist? 
Another interesting possibility for further research which has arisen from this 
study is, as mentioned earlier, the connection between the mind/body dualism of 
Descartes and the form/matter composition that Henry constructs. In an article of 
Franziskanische Studien, Gordon Wilson considers a relation between Henry’s theory of 
the unity of Man to Descartes’ unity of composition.161 Wilson concludes with this 
observation: ‘It certainly is not contended here that either (Henry/Descartes) fully 
elaborated or that either thinker was fully conscious of the direction to which his 
thought was leading him. Yet within the philosophies of both thinkers there is an 
undeniable, although not elaborated, suggestion of the doctrine of what Kant would 
describe as empirical realism.’ Having now examined Henry’s treatment of the divine 
persons in article 53 of his Summa, we may be able to say that Henry was more aware of 
such implications than once assumed.162 Or, at the very least, have more textual support 
with which to consider the possibility.  
V. Concept Formation 
The issue of personhood impacts Henry’s thoughts on concept formation since 
the second person of the Trinity is, of course, the ‘Word.’ Henry understood the human 
ability to form concepts as related to the Fathers ability to produce the Word. (The 
Father does not actually have vocal chords, so this word is purely conceptual.) This 
connection, albeit interesting, is beyond the scope of our project here. But I mention it 
                                                           
161 Wilson, G.A. Henry of Ghent and Rene Descartes on the Unity of Man, in: Franzisk Stud. 64, 1982, 97-
110. 
162 Ibid., p.110, n.49.  
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as an aside since it may be another, unexpected epistemological ramification of Henry’s 
Trinitarian thought. For further insight into Henry’s thought on the subject, I 
recommend the following works by Russel Friedman, Bernd Goehring, and Juan Carlos 
Flores (All of whom have contributed a helpful clarity to this very complicated subject.):  
FRIEDMAN, R. 
- Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham Cambridge 2010.  
 
FLORES, J. C. 
- “Intellect and Will as Natural Principles,” in Henry of Ghent and the 
Transformation of Scholastic Thought: Studies in Memory of Jos Decorte, edd. 
Guy Guldentops and Carlos Steel, (Leuven, Leuven University Press, 2003), pp. 
277- 306. 
- Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity, (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, 
Series 1) XXVI (Leuven, 2006), viii+239pp.  
- “Henry of Ghent on the Trinity” in A Companion to Henry of Ghent, (Brill’s 
Companions to the Christian Tradition, vol. 23), ed. Gordon Wilson (Leiden, 
2011), pp. 135-150.  
GOEHRING, B. 
- Henry of Ghent on Cognition and Mental Representation, Cornell University, 
(diss.) 2006.  
- “Intelligit se intelligere rem intellectam: Henry of Ghent on Thought and 
Reflexivity,” in Quaestio: The Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics 10, (2010), 
pp. 111- 133. 
- “Henry of Ghent on the Verbum Mentis” in A Companion to Henry of Ghent, 
(Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition, vol. 23), ed. Gordon Wilson 
(Leiden, 2011), pp. 241-272. 
- “Henry of Ghent on Human Knowledge and Its Limits,” in Quaestio: The Yearbook 
of the History of Metaphysics 12, (2012), pp. 25-49. 
- “Henry of Ghent’s Use of Aristotle’s De anima in Developing His Theory of 
Cognition,” in Medieval Perspectives on Aristotle’s De Anima, eds. Russel 
FRIEDMAN and Jean-Michel COUNET, (Philosophes Médiévaux) 58 (Leuven – 




VI. From ‘Persona’ to Personal Identity 
This project, including the text with which it is engaged, is fundamentally a study 
of personhood. By personhood, I mean that it involves a philosophical approach to the 
problem of personal identity. This is, both historically and analytically, a very 
complicated, broad-reaching problem and many approaches to it have been taken. One 
may, for example, take the problem of personal identity to involve metaphysical 
questions about the nature of a person, i.e. questions like ‘Who am I?’ or ‘What am I 
constituted of?’ Or, one may refer to personal-identity in terms of persistence (what 
does it take for a person to remain the same through time?), evidence (how do we find 
out who is who?), difference (Could I have been other than I am?), or the ethical (Why 
does it matter?). Personal identity, rather than being a straightforward, simple problem, 
is really a myriad of loosely connected ones. In his Summa, article 53, q.1 Henry 
approaches the problem from the standpoint of personhood- essentially, asking for the 
definition of the word person. (For example, what is it to be a person? Or, what is 
necessary and suffices for something to be called a person rather than something else?)  
We see, in question 1, Henry considering this question in terms of the divine 
persons, namely, can we say that the divine is a person/s. Besides being concerned with 
the definition of person, we might say that Henry is also concerned with issues of 
population, insofar as he is asking how many persons may populate a single essence, or 
to be precise, how can a monotheistic God be considered as a triune compound of 
persons? (In contemporary scholarship, this is sometimes called ‘synchronic identity’. 
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See Stanford Personhood). The notion of personhood, for today’s society (rather than 
just those who are engaged with the historical/medieval discussions above), is of utmost 
importance and expanding in the subject matter to which it applies.  
 
 
 
 
